

THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION, AND THE
POST-REVOLUTION IMPACTS ON EGYPT'S FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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2012-02

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-12-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2012 – DEC 2012	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Egyptian Military's Role in The 25 January Revolution, and The Post-Revolution Impacts on Egypt's Foreign Relations and Middle East Stability				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Ehab Elsayed Elhadad				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT On February 11, 2011, Egypt entered a new epoch of its history. The Egyptian people supported by the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) succeeded in toppling the 30-year rule of the former President Mubarak. Unlike the militaries of Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the EAF stood on the people's side, and directed the country towards democracy. The rise of the Islamists has filled the political gap created by the fall of the former regime, and caused a political shift. Recent events have reconfigured that three main centers of power are reshaping the country's future: the military, the Islamists, and those who started the uprising. Change in the political system has unequivocal impacts on the country's foreign relations and stability in Middle East. Therefore, understanding the EAF's role in the revolution and the nature of the political change is vital to understanding Egyptian foreign relations and their impacts on Middle East stability.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Military Role Egypt 25 January Revolution 2011					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	99	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE 25 JANUARY REVOLUTION, AND THE POST-REVOLUTION IMPACTS ON EGYPT'S FOREIGN RELATIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY, by Major Ehab Elsayed Elhadad, 99 pages.

On February 11, 2011, Egypt entered a new epoch of its history. The Egyptian people supported by the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) succeeded in toppling the 30-year rule of the former President Mubarak. Unlike the militaries of Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the EAF stood on the people's side, and directed the country towards democracy. The rise of the Islamists has filled the political gap created by the fall of the former regime, and caused a political shift. Recent events have reconfigured that three main centers of power are reshaping the country's future: the military, the Islamists, and those who started the uprising. Change in the political system has unequivocal impacts on the country's foreign relations and stability in Middle East. Therefore, understanding the EAF's role in the revolution and the nature of the political change is vital to understanding Egyptian foreign relations and their impacts on Middle East stability.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest thanks to those that offered support and encouragement throughout this research project. First, to my wife, Manal, for enduring the long hours of study that occupied countless hours of my time as well as her unfailing commitment to maintain balance in our home. Sacrifices made by the family exacted a high price to complete this study and it would not have been possible without a best friend by my side.

I would also like to thank my committee for their expert counsel and commitment to the project. As committee chair, Dr. Phillip Pattee kept the research project on track and served as a guide through the process from start to end. Mr. Jeff Vordermark and Mr. Richard Anderson offered expert perspective and encouragement. I express my sincerest gratitude to the committee for being a part of the team.

This work is dedicated to the Egyptians' people, who were the reason of change, and Egyptian Armed Forces, who have supported the Egyptians' people during the revolution, and ensure the success of revolution in order to provide a better future for next generations. Thanks for the Egyptian Armed Forces for its leading role in maintaining the revolution and ensuring freedom and democracy. As you have always done, your historical role is not forgotten.

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ACRONYMS

AOI	Arab Organization for Industrialization
EAF	Egyptian Armed Forces
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
ME	Middle East.
NDP	National Democratic Party
NSPO	National Service Project Organization
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I want to commend the Egyptian military for the professionalism and patriotism that it has shown thus far in allowing peaceful protests while protecting the Egyptian people. We've seen tanks covered with banners, and soldiers and protesters embracing in the streets.

—President Obama, February 1, 2011

Background

The 25 January revolution is a unique event in the modern Egyptian history. It is the fifth revolution since the beginning of the 19th century. The first revolution brought Mohammad Ali Pasha and the Renaissance to Egypt in 1805.¹ The second revolution was launched by Ahmed Urabi Pasha against the increasing European domination of the country in 1881.² The third was the 1919 revolution against the British colonialists in Egypt. The fourth one was the July 23, 1952 revolution by a military coup d'état, which was led by the Free Officers Movement, aimed at overthrowing King Farouk. Four of the previous revolutions resulted from a partnership between the people and the Army on the revolutions' establishment, protection, and implementation.

A number of political leaders and analysts worldwide have agreed that there are two reasons this most recent revolution has unique characteristics. Firstly, it is a revolution without a leader, which promptly attracted huge masses into its ranks. Secondly, owing to restriction on freedom of expression by the government, the revolution started from a virtual space—the Internet—with all its new tools, Facebook and Twitter, and became reality.³

The planning for the revolution started on the Worldwide Web, and turned into reality after defining a time and space for its birth. The date was January 25, 2011, the date from which the revolution got its name; the location was Al-Tahrir square, Cairo. The main players were first, the Egyptian people, who fomented the revolution; second, the police forces actions, who were a catalyst for public dissatisfaction and a main factor that led to the revolution; third, the Islamic and liberal parties, who took advantage of the people's success; finally, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), who were a crucial factor to the success of the revolution through their bias in favor of the people and their role in shaping the environment for post-revolution reforms. The revolution's objective was to topple President Mubarak and his regime. After 18 days, the revolution achieved its primary goal successfully, when President Mubarak handed over the power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11, 2011. The revolution's momentum continued to force all the figures of the former regime to stand trial for all the injustices, and corruption they committed against the Egyptian citizens during the last 30 years.

The 25 January revolution created a political and social shift. The active participation in the referendum on constitutional amendments, as well as the mobility and healthy dialogue amongst different classes of the society for shaping their desired future--to follow the right route for political and democratic renaissance that meets the aspiration of the Egyptian citizens--is clear evidence that Egypt is moving in the right direction.

In coping with the 25 January revolution with its resulting manifestations and outcomes in the Egyptian domestic arena as well as the regional and global ones, this thesis contributes to the increasing awareness of the importance of the event and its

indicators both domestically or internationally. Egypt with its deep-rooted civilization enjoys a particular geopolitical importance. Moreover, Egypt has been a challenge to many academics, researchers, local and global research centers, persistently trying to examine Egypt's post-revolution political composition, social structure, economic conditions, and military influence. They also squeeze their minds to know the impact of these elements on Egypt's role in terms of hard and soft power in the Middle East, as well as the impact on the geostrategic map of the world's power forces. The events and the facts that seem to be purely Egyptian internal affairs, by virtue of the Egyptian geography, would also have regional manifestations that extended beyond Egypt's border and deeply affect the regional environment, particularly the Middle East (ME). The Figure 1, Map of Egypt, shows the cities and towns where the strikes and protests began.



Figure 1. Map of Egypt

Source: Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Transition under Military Rule," June 21, 2012, www.fas.org (accessed September 12, 2012), modified by the author.

Factors that led to the Revolution

There is always a gap between people's expectations and reality in all the countries. When the gap increases, revolutions are likely to happen. It is still unknown in which area of the gap revolutions are likely to happen; however, there are always triggers that lead to the revolutions. The 25 January revolution was not a surprise except for those who had their eyes closed to the economic, political, social, and psychological factors that had been accumulating over the past three decades. On January 25, 2011, the

Egyptian uprising started in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and in other cities in Egypt. Millions of protesters from different social classes, college students, and different faiths protested against President Mubarak’s regime and the police brutality. The people emphasized the peaceful nature of the revolution. Nevertheless, several violent clashes still erupted between the police and protesters.

Indirect Factors that Led to the Revolution

Scholars believe direct and indirect factors led to the revolution (see figure 2). The indirect factors were due to the Emergency Law, the police brutality, Mubarak’s Regime, corruption and poor economic, political, and social conditions, the increase in population and increasing poverty rates, and exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel.⁴




Figure 2. Chronology of Direct and Indirect Factors that Led to the Revolution

Source: Created by author as a summary of all the above-presented data.

The Emergency Law was enforced following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. Under this state of emergency, police power was extended, constitutional rights were suspended, and censorship was legalized. The law formally restricted any non-governmental political activity, street demonstrations, non-approved political organizations, and unregistered financial donations. Since the enforcement of the Emergency Law began in 1981, about 17,000 people were detained, and estimates of political prisoners run as high as 30,000.⁵

A long history of police brutality was another key catalyst for the revolution. That brutality was closely tied to the Emergency Law and became a catalyst for the revolution following the deaths of two Egyptian youth, while in police custody, before and during the revolution.⁶

Former President Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years. Mubarak's regime maintained violence against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Salafis.⁷ Furthermore, his regime contributed significantly to the economic, political, and social deterioration. Therefore, Mubarak's regime was criticized by the Egyptian citizens, media, and NGOs.

During Mubarak's ruling period, political corruption increased because he had to expand his influence to secure and extend his presidency. Mubarak maintained an absolute ban on Egypt's biggest political party, the MB, even after its leadership renounced violence and embraced the democratic process. In addition, because of control of trade and finance by individuals from the (former) regime, the standards of living deteriorated below other countries in the area. By the end of 2010, (40 percent) of the citizens were living below the poverty line with only two dollars per day.

The former regime failed to solve the economic and social problems that faced Egypt during the last 30 years. The population increased rapidly to 85 million, but due to lack of vision and policies, there was no strategy to meet the increased demands on society. Consequently, the rate of unemployment increased, medical services were either poor or inadequate, levels of educations deteriorated, and crime spread throughout the country. People became disillusioned with the former government's un-kept promises to establish or improve essential services.

In 2004, the former government signed four contracts to export natural gas to Israel until 2030.⁸ The government did not reveal any details of these agreements. The political opposition, however, publicized the deal details, which for several reasons caused a domestic crisis. First, the gas was to be exported at less than the global market price. Second, the monetary benefits went to Mubarak's family who were running the gas company; not the Egyptian people. Third, there was insufficient gas in Egypt to meet the Egyptians' domestic demands. Finally, normalization of relations with Israel remained a sensitive issue; most of the Egyptian people did not approve. Egyptians considered these contracts a waste of the public money, a compliment to Israel, and the contracts were marred by corruption and lack of transparency. While these indirect factors would not alone lead to the revolution, there were other direct factors that incited the people and sparked the revolution.

Direct Factors that Led to the Revolution

The direct causes that sparked the revolution, outlined below according to a chronological order, include events both within and outside of Egypt that created an atmosphere necessary for revolutionary change to occur:

Khaled Saeed, a young Egyptian man, died under uncertain circumstances in Alexandria on June 6, 2010, after being arrested by Egyptian security forces. News about the incident spread through social network and triggered outrage over allegations that police killed him.⁹ The long history of police brutality fueled the public's suspicions, and the post-revolution investigations proved these allegations to be true.

As a result of the previous event and due to restrictions over speech and free opinion, a prominent Facebook group, "We are all Khaled Saeed," moderated by the cyber activist Wael Ghonim, brought attention to Khaled's death and contributed to growing discontent in the weeks leading up to the Egyptian revolution of 2011.¹⁰ Wael Ghonim motivated the Egyptian youth to protest against police brutality and arranged for the 25 January revolution with other groups through Facebook and Twitter.¹¹ At this phase, the MB, Salafis, and other political parties were not involved.

The 2010 People's Assembly elections were held two months before the outbreak of protests, where the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) acquired 95 percent of the Council's seats, leaving no place for opposition. In addition, the MB was prevented from participating in the elections. According to human rights groups, the elections were described as illegal and fraudulent due to a lack of judicial supervision and not reflecting the Egyptians opinion.¹²

Another factor that inspired the Egyptian youth was the Tunisian revolution. It began on December 18, mainly due to political, economic, and social problems similar to those that faced Egypt. The Tunisians protesters succeeded in toppling President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. The success of the Tunisian revolution gave hope to the Egyptians that they could make a change. Consequently, Egypt followed suit.

On the 1st of January 2011, the Alexandria bombing targeted “The Church of Saints” causing 23 killed, and 97 wounded, including Muslim and Christian Egyptians. The incident caused social unrest with no one brought to trial. Eventually, investigations revealed that, the former interior minister had masterminded the deadly church attack with the intent to blame it on Islamists,¹³ escalate government crackdown on them, and gain increased western support for the regime.¹⁴

Continuing the former interior minister’s plan, on January 5, 2011, Sayed Bilal, an Egyptian young man from Alexandria, was arrested along with many of the Salafis¹⁵ for questioning in the bombing of the Church of Saints. Unfortunately, the police tortured him to death, and then returned him dead to his family.¹⁶

A week before the revolution, four youth immolated themselves in Tahrir Square, protesting against unemployment, poor economic, political, and social conditions just as the Tunisian man “Bouazizi” did. This phenomenon sparked the people’s sympathy, and made them express their dissatisfaction with the dismal overall situation.

Due to the previous indirect and direct factors, on January 25, 2011, the Egyptian citizens went to Tahrir Square calling for several demands; (1) President Mubarak be removed from power and leave; (2) both the People's Assembly and Shura Council be dissolved; (3) the former corrupt officials be brought to a fair trial; (4) the police leaders be removed from their positions and brought to a trial; (5) a transitional government be established; (6) a new constitution be developed; (7) presidential and legislative elections be held; finally, the protestors demanded the EAF support to secure and protect the revolution. The next Figure illustrates the direct and indirect factors that led to the 25 January revolution in a chronological order.

Problem Statement

On February 11, 2011, Egypt entered a new epoch of its history. The Egyptian people supported by the EAF succeeded in toppling the 30-year rule of former President Hosni Mubarak. Unlike the militaries of Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the EAF stood on the people's side, and directed the country towards democracy. The rise of the Islamists has filled the political gap created by the fall of the former regime, and caused a shift in the political system. Recent events have reconfigured that three main centers of power are reshaping the country's future (the military, the Islamists, and those who started the uprising).¹⁷ Change in the political system has unequivocal impacts on the country's foreign relations and stability in ME. Therefore, understanding the EAF's role in the revolution and the nature of the political change is vital to understanding Egyptian foreign relations and their impacts on ME stability.

Primary Research Question

This study seeks to answer this question:

How has the EAF's role in the 25 January revolution and the rise of the Islamists post-revolution affected Egypt's foreign relations and the Middle East stability?

Secondary Research Questions

In order to facilitate a sequential analysis that leads to an answer to the primary research question, the study must answer the following secondary questions:

1. What were the factors that led to the revolution?
2. How has the Egyptian Armed Forces secured and supported the revolution?

3. What were the challenges, and how did the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces deal with these challenges in order to stabilize Egypt?

Based on the answer to the above-mentioned secondary question, the study must examine the next questions:

1. What is the future of the Egyptian Military status in Egypt's future?

2. How will the shift in the political landscape and the rise of the Islamists affect Egypt's future?

3 Which political archetype is Egypt likely to follow?

Finally, this study must answer the question:

4. What is the future of Egypt's foreign relations associated with the shift in the political realm, and how will this impact the Middle East stability?

Significance of the Study

Like any revolution, the Egyptian revolution was followed by a huge change in the political and social structures, which will have impacts on Egypt's foreign relations. On one hand, this study is important to develop a better understanding of the military role in supporting and protecting the revolution, to discuss the impacts of the current transition political system, and to visualize the potential scenarios of Egypt's foreign relations with the U.S and other regional powers. On the other hand, this study is relevant to the current U.S. national strategic policies regarding the ME. Thus, the results of this study could be used to assess an alternate and more sustainable strategy aimed at maintaining and promoting ME stability.

Limitations

Three important limitations affect the scope and depth of this study. First, there is a general lack of quantitative data, which could add more precision to this study. Second, the study is limited by the time available during the ILE academic year as well as lack of resources. Despite many references, most do not present the Egyptian perspective, and are limited to a specific period or event. Finally, the dynamics of the revolution makes many potential writers and scholars reluctant to write about the subject for credibility reasons. All of these reasons create uneasiness during research and promote uncertainty in the preparation of accurate materials and forming conclusions based on credible scientific processes.

Delimitations

In addition to the limitations presented in the previous paragraphs, four delimitations apply. First, the thesis will remain unclassified. Second, due to constant change in the revolution's dynamic, the study shall limit itself to information available prior to May 2012 (the presidential elections and the handover of power to a civil authority). Third, the research will only focus on the EAF's role in the revolution, provide a general overview about the transitional political system by giving special attention to the MB, and only examine Egypt's future relation with the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and Israel. I will not address the people's role in the revolution. Finally, the thesis presents a conceptual perspective. It addresses the author's ideas and does not represent any official policies or strategies of the government of Egypt or the EAF.

Summary

This chapter introduced the background of the study, explaining the direct and indirect causes of the revolution. This background set the basis to look at the role of the EAF in achieving the people's demands and securing and protecting the revolution. This chapter further outlined the problem statement, the primary and secondary research questions, significance of the study, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. In the next chapter, I will tackle the concept of revolution, and the conditions guaranteeing its success by exploring some practical models of the most prominent revolutions in the modern era.

¹Mohammed Ali was an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army, who declared himself Khedive of Egypt in 1805.

²Ahmed Urabi was an Egyptian army General, who led the revolution of 1881.

³More about the role of technology and internet in Egypt's Revolution, see Xiaolin Zhuo, Barry Wellman, and Justine Yu, "Egypt: The First Internet Revolt," *Peace Magazine*, June 2011, homes.chass.utoronto.ca (accessed April 14, 2012).

⁴Despite normalization the relation with Israel, the nature of the relation still sensitive due to cultural and historical considerations; people wanted peace without any economic relations.

⁵May Kassem, *In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt* (Reading, UK: Garnet and Ithaca Press, 2000), 57-58.

⁶Two Egyptian youth were killed in Cairo and Alexandria by police forces during investigations and later sent home as corpses.

⁷Owing to Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel of 1978, Islamic fundamentalists assassinated President Sadat in 1981. Subsequently, all Islamists activities including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis groups were severely restricted by the former regime for security reasons.

⁸Egypt State Information Service, www.sis.gov.eg (accessed May 13, 2012).

⁹We are all Khaled Said, Background Story, Khaled a story of many Egyptians, www.elshaheed.co.uk/home-khaled-said-full-story-background-truth-what-happened-torture-in-egypt-by-egyptian-police/ (accessed May 17, 2012).

¹⁰Dr Sahar Khamis, and Katherine Vaughn, “Cyber-activism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance,” The Arab Media and Society, www.arabmediasociety.com (accessed May 28, 2012).

¹¹Further information about the media role in the 2011 revolution examine, see MAJ Brian L. Mayer, “Modern Social Media and Social Revolutions” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011-02), www.hsdl.org/?view&did=703593 (accessed May 15, 2012).

¹²Human Rights Watch, “Elections in Egypt, State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair,” December 2010, www.hrw.org (accessed May 23, 2012).

¹³The former Egypt’s Constitution prohibited the formation of any party based on religion or discrimination under any form. Currently, out of 50 political parties, there are (14) Islamic religious political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party is the largest followed by the Salafis of the Al-Nour Party, and the Building and Development Party. A map of Egypt’s political map will be included in chapter IV.

¹⁴Farrag Ismail, “Ex-minister suspected behind Alex church bombing,” “Monday, February 7, 2011, *Arabia News*, www.alarabiya.net (accessed April 10, 2012).

¹⁵Salafis are the Muslims who emphasize the Salaf (“predecessors” or “ancestors”), the earliest Muslims, as model examples of Islamic practice. Salafism has become associated with literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islam and, in the West, with the Salafi Jihadis who espouse violent jihad against civilians as a legitimate expression of Islam. It has been noted that the Western association of Salafi ideology with violence stems from writings done “through the prism of security studies” that were published in the late 20th century, having persisted well into contemporary literature.

¹⁶Egypt State Information Service, www.sis.gov.eg (accessed May 13, 2012).

¹⁷Khaled Elgindy, “Egypt’s Troubled Transition: Elections without Democracy,” *The Washington Quarterly* 35 (March 19, 2012): 89-104.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

The Arab Spring has created much interest in the current literature, with scholars and politicians trying to assess the merits and risks implied in this regional phenomenon voiced by various academics. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview on the literature of revolutions. A significant number of documents and books exists dealing with this subject; however, none of them deals directly with the 2011 Egypt's revolution. In order to gain insight into the topic, I will use unclassified sources such as books, various theses, magazines, journals, and the internet to study and analyze the main revolutions in Egypt's history and the revolutions of Eastern Europe. The literature review will be done by using theoretical and analytical approaches to look at the concept of the revolution, conditions that are predictors of successful outcomes of a revolution, stages of revolutions, and finally, applied models of the most popular revolutions.

The Concept of the Revolution

Revolution is a process of rapid and radical change of the social, economic, and political systems, leading to toppling an old regime and its related elite. Aristotle described two types of the revolutions; (1) complete change from one constitution to another; (2) modification of an existing constitution.¹ Thus, a revolution is different from the processes of small or medium change, which maintains the old system. A real revolution is examined by checking whether it had ousted the old entourage or not. If the old system endures, then what happened is not a revolution. In any revolution, the new

order completely replaces the old one. This does not mean that the revolution needs to be bloody. For example, in 1989, most of the Eastern Europe countries, except Romania, experienced radical regime change without bloodshed.

A revolution is more than a wide spread frustration. People may not be satisfied with a certain condition such as dissatisfaction among farmers concerning crop prices, dismay of intellectuals for the lack of freedom, or dissatisfaction of businessmen because of corruption. If there is no responsible organization that directs citizen's feelings or people's frustrations toward an end, the state of frustration will not affect the regime. Discontent and chaos alone will not be able to overthrow a regime; thus, the organization leader is essential to spur revolutions. Peter McDonough and Antonio Lopez Pina have come to such conclusion in their study on the political orientation of the Brazilians.² They found out that among Brazilians there was a great deal dissatisfaction towards the authoritarian regime. These feelings of dissatisfaction, however, did not have a channel through which to defuse. Consequently, the presence of frustration, violence, riots, and strikes in a society such as existed in Brazil does not necessarily lead to revolution. Without a well-organized opposition, there will be no revolution.

However, the idea of a peaceful revolution is based in two principles. First, the authoritarian power is not a deaf entity, but is a dynamic and compound structure, which does not control the people except if they accept such restriction. Therefore, revolution does not need a direct confrontation with the repressive regime, but it is enough to deprive it of control in society, and to prove its inability to govern. Control is the treasure of the ruling tyrant. If he loses control over the lives of people, he would lose self-confidence and his downfall would be inevitable. Peaceful revolutions do not directly

destroy tyrannical regimes, but they exhaust them by depriving the regimes of support from some essential components that constitute a basis for regime authority.

Consequently, the authoritarian structure would fall by its own.

A second viewpoint is that the direct bloody violence against an authoritarian power is not an optimal choice, as the peaceful resistance is more useful and lasting. The American political debater, Gene Sharp notes in his book entitled *From Dictators to Democracy* that peaceful revolutions are based on the concept of “Calm Heroism,” which refuses to respond to the violence of tyrannical authorities by adopting opposite-violence.³ Use of bloody tactics by an opposition directs the tyrannical authority towards violent response, and gives the tyrannical authority a self-defense policy and a legitimate justification.

Thus, popular revolutions are a mixture of spontaneity and organization. Spontaneity protects the revolution from suppression, and organization helps it to do well. Every revolution needs leadership, but leadership in the internet age can be soft and symbolic rather than hierarchal. This is what makes its suppression difficult and its eradication impossible. Revolution manages to chase the tyrannical regime while itself becoming unshakable. This kind of soft leadership gives the community the upper hand over the authority that is used to the hierarchical leadership.

Predictors of Successful Outcomes of a Revolution

Spontaneity and organization are not enough to propel a revolution to success. According to the “The Logic of Revolution and its Consequences” by Mohammed Shanqeeti, the history of some early and modern revolutions indicates that the most important conditions that predict a successful revolution are:⁴

1. The strength of will and determination of the revolutionaries.
 2. Maintaining a flawless image of the revolution.
 3. Unity and cohesion between the public powers.
 4. Targeting the important power centers of the undesired regime.
 5. Offering a political alternative to prevent the remnants of the regime of any opportunity to have power.
 6. Refusing lower goals or superficial changes within the regime.
 7. Adhering to the principles of being dominant, not claimant.
 8. International support and legitimacy.
 9. The support of the National Armed Forces or other national power center in order to protect the revolution and the revolutionaries from suppression by the old regime.
 10. Finally, a public revolution needs to have a message. Such a message should be simple, easy to be understood, and serve to unify people not scattering them.
- Revolutionaries are brought together by principles and are dispersed by programs. The most important conditions for the success of revolutions are that revolutionaries must focus on the comprehensive principles, and must avoid going into detailed programs during the revolution. Details bring confusion and chaos; highlighting differences and divisions, causing infighting, the ruin of revolutions.

Stages of the Revolutions

Crane Briton, in his book published in 1938 entitled *The Anatomy of Revolutions*, mentioned specific phases for each revolution. He examined this claim through his study of the English revolution in 1688, the American revolution in 1776, the French revolution

in 1789, and the Russian revolution in 1917. However, I am not going to apply all of these stages in my research, Briton's approach will help in predicting the post-revolution political behavior. These four stages are exemplified as following.⁵

The Collapse of the Old Regime

In this stage, a feeling of dissatisfaction towards the government develops because of mismanagement and increase of corruption. Accordingly, the people's trust in the government gradually fades away. Likewise, the government begins to lose its confidence. As a result, intellectuals turn their loyalty toward another proposed regime that has a degree of idealism or credibility. This coincides with starting a process of economic modernization that plays a major role in provoking the feelings of resentment.

The Change of the Status Quo

This stage begins by starting to move in order to change the status quo. Plotting against the existing regime begins by the formation of committees, networks, and cells that aim at overthrowing of the old regime. This step is always accompanied of other aspects of public uprising, such as the refusal to pay taxes, or the start of a public strike. Moreover, a political dilemma that defies solution starts. Consequently, the government calls its security forces to protect its stability, which would lead to the opposite of the desired results due to revolutionaries' resistance and increased anger. At this point, intervention of a strong element such as the military would be a decisive factor; whether to support the revolutionaries or to support the existing regime. Without support from the strong element, eventually, the regime finds itself outside the scope of power, and the people's joyfulness increases with the regime is failure.

The Stage of Moderates' Assuming Powers

During this stage, moderates, who opposed the old regime or stand on the people's side, often assume leadership; however, they may still be linked to the old regime's ideas or ideology. They start moderate, non-radical reforms, which are considered insufficient for most of the revolutionaries. Those moderates may be accused of having compromised with the old regime or other radical power. To sustain legitimacy, moderates will not show a desire to crush the radicals; instead however, the moderates elect to stand side by side with radicals to run the country.

The Stage of Extremists Assuming Power

Extremists, who are stronger and more organized gradually get the power and lead the revolution. They impose obedience to the values and laws of the new regime, and punish those who make mistakes. At the end, society cannot escalate the revolution. The people become exhausted due to the state of temporary insanity. They crave stability, reactivation of economy, and living in peace and security. This increases fears that a dictator or one dominant party, who is similar to the old regime, would grab power to restore stability, which appeals to most of the people.

Applied Models of the Most Popular Revolutions

The previous four stages of any revolution explain the theory of the revolution cycle, where people of a country make a revolution, and after a while, they make another one to get rid of the current, and so on. In this part of chapter II, I will identify some applied models of the most popular revolts in Egypt and Eastern Europe, showing the role that military support to civil resistance has on the success of a revolution. This will

help in interpreting the current stage of revolutionary momentum in Egypt by displaying the historical relation between the people and the Army. One theme among these revolutions was the peaceful civil resistance against one dominant party that contributed to change.

The Previous Revolutions in Egypt

The successive events of the 25 January were not the first of their kind in Egypt. This great country witnessed a series of revolutions and uprising with hundreds of thousands of people coming out into the streets either calling for the demise of colonialism, or rejecting social injustice and demanding the termination of corruption. The following are the most prominent of these stations.

The Urabi Revolution in 1881

The Urabi Revolution was not only military, but it was also a revolution of the people.⁶ The Urabi revolution resulted from different reasons. First, endowing privileges to Turkish and Circassian officers, who issued a resolution aimed at blocking the promotion of Egyptian officers. Second, the poor economic conditions and high taxes applied by the Ottomans. Third, foreign interference in Egypt's domestic affairs by the Ottoman's Sultan. Finally, the absolute rule of the Khedive, who derived his authority from the Sultan. These causes flared up the rage of the Egyptian people and incited the direct spark that launched the revolution. This revolution is characterized by the fact that it combined intellectuals from the people and revolutionary enlightened officers. It witnessed a strong cohesion among traditional intellectuals from Al-Azhar⁷ scholars, modern intellectuals, and graduates from European missions.

This revolution was launched by the Army and supported by the people. Although, the revolution failed to achieve its goals due to the British invasion in 1882, it reflects the strong relationship between the three elements; the Army, the people, and Al-Azhar (the main source of Sunni Islamic studies in the Muslim world) in shaping Egypt's history.

The 1919 Revolution

The 1919 Revolution was a turning point in Egypt's political, economic, and intellectual history.⁸ It was overflowed from Cairo University into Al-Tahrir square. The direct reason behind this revolution was the arrest of Saad Zghloul by the British Occupation and his exile to Malta Island because of his demand for Egypt's independence. Meanwhile, the main reasons behind the eruption of the revolution were the injustice and the manipulation of the occupation forces during WWI; second, Britain drafted a corps of farmers and forced them to fight for the Allies in what was known as "Egyptian Task Force"; and lastly, deterioration of the living conditions. In response, England permitted the Egyptian delegation under leadership of Zaghloul to attend the Conciliation Conference in Paris to present the issue of Egypt's impendence.

Unlike the Urabi Revolution, the 1919 Revolution was launched by the people without the Army in a supporting role due to the army's fight outside the country. Nevertheless, the revolution succeeded in achieving its goals, and Egypt got its independence in 1922. This revolution reflected the unity of the Egyptian Muslims led by Al-Azhar, and the Christians in shaping Egypt's history.

The 23 July Revolution in 1952

This revolution is a movement made by officers from the various EAF and supported by the people, who experienced all kinds of slavery and humiliation during the royal era.⁹ This Revolution forced King Farouq to step down, and the British to leave Egypt.¹⁰ Because of the Army's role, a new era of revolutionary work had started, rule of Egypt was returned to its own sons after thousands of years of colonialism. Furthermore, Egypt became a regional power that dominated the political and economic relations in Africa and the ME due to "The Domino Effect" of the revolution that spread all over the Arab and African countries. The 1952 Revolution is an example of complete harmony and cohesion between Egypt's trinity: the people, the Army, and Al-Azhar. The Revolution succeeded in achieving its primary goals, and demonstrated that the Army is a cornerstone in Egypt's past and present.

The Revolutions of Eastern Europe

In late 1989 and early 1990, the world had a date with history, where Eastern Europe witnessed a peaceful civil resistance after decades of stagnations during the Cold War. The Soviet Communist Leader Mikhail Gorbachev had started applying the Perestroika movement against the principles of the Russian 1917 Revolution and its philosophy of Marxist–Leninism. This was instigated because of economic crisis and the awareness of conditions with the outside world, which helped overcome the intellectual and organizational obstacles.

With regard to the huge advancement of Western Europe on the Atlantic Coast, the last decade of the 20th century had witnessed both intellectual and physical achievements. No matter how powerful the Iron Curtain was, it could not prevent

intellectual or physical gains of freedom and democracy from reaching Eastern Europe. The Revolutions of Eastern Europe connect the civil resistance with the Western liberal democracy on one hand, and show post-revolutions' impacts on the countries' foreign relations, especially with the West. With today's advanced ways of communication such as the internet, any sort of physical or virtual walls in the era of globalization have been demolished.

Summary

By applying theoretical and analytical approaches in studying historical examples of revolutions, I came out with three main points. First, civil resistance and support of the military have always been critical factors that led to revolution failure or success. Second, through studying the main revolutions in Egypt's history, it is obvious that the people, the Islamists, and the Army are the main power centers that influence Egypt's past, present, and future. Third, revolutions are a mixture of spontaneity and organization. This is clear in the 25 January revolution, when cyber activists succeeded to transfer the people's frustration and anger to an uprising against the old regime. Shortly afterward, people organized themselves and started their revolt that led to toppling the former regime. Indeed, Egypt witnessed failure and success due to many factors, which means, nothing is guaranteed in this ambiguous world. Therefore, in the next chapter, I will define the methodology used to answer the research questions regarding the Egyptian Army and the Islamic political parties that always have influenced Egypt's history.

¹Aristotle, *The Politics V*, trans. T. A. Sinclair (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), 190.

²Peter McDonough, Samuel Henry Barnes, and Antonio López Pina, *The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain* (USA, 1998), book review.

³“From Dictatorship to Democracy” was written at the request of the late U Tin Maung Win, a prominent exile Burmese democrat who was then editor of Khit Pyaing (*The New Era Journal*).

⁴Mohammed Shanqeeti, “The Logic of Revolution and its Consequences,” Al Jazeera net, April 24, 2011, www.aljazeera.com (accessed April 27, 2012).

⁵Eman Ahmed Ragab, “Special Concepts of the Political System Collapse,” Alsyassa El-dawlia, April 2011, no 148, www.siyassa.org.eg (accessed April 27, 2012).

⁶Donald Malcolm Reid, *The Cambridge History of Egypt, Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, Chapter 9: “The ‘Urabi revolution and the British conquest, 1879–1882” (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁷Al-Azhar is an Islamic educational university in Cairo, Egypt. Founded by Jawhar the Sicilian, commander of the Fatimid troops sent by the Fatimid Caliph Almuiz to conquer Egypt in 970-972. It is the chief center of Arabic literature and Islamic learning in the world. Al-Azhar University concerns itself with the religious syllabus, which pays special attention to Quran sciences and traditions of the prophet, on the one hand, while on the other, university teaches all the modern scientific fields of science. Al-Azhar has always had a significant role in Egypt’s political system and still. Currently, Al-Azhar issued two documents in an attempt to reach a constitutional agreement among the political parties.

⁸Donald Malcolm Reid, *The Cambridge History of Egypt, Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, Chapter 9: “The 1919 Revolution” (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰King Farouq was the tenth ruler from the Muhammad Ali Dynasty and the penultimate King of Egypt and Sudan, succeeding his father, Fuad I, in 1936.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The main purpose of this qualitative study is to investigate the military role in the 25 January revolution, and post-revolution impacts on Egypt's foreign relations and Middle East stability associated with the rise of the Islamists. The thesis is an attempt to understand the unique relation between the Egyptian people, the Islamists, and the Army during the 25 January revolution.¹ This chapter will include the discussion of the chosen research methodology, design, data collection, validity, and analysis, and finally, ethical assurances. The study further aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What were the factors that led to the revolution?
2. How has the Egyptian Armed Forces secured and supported the revolution?
3. What were the challenges, and how did the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces deal with these challenges in order to stabilize Egypt?
4. What is the future of the Egyptian Military status in Egypt's future?
5. How will the shift in the political landscape and the rise of the Islamists affect Egypt's future?
6. Which political archetype is Egypt likely to follow?
7. What is the future of Egypt's foreign relations associated with the shift in the political realm, and how will this affect Middle East stability?

Research Method

A qualitative research methodology is used for this study. Michael Patton defined qualitative research as attempting to understand the unique interactions in a specific

situation.² The purpose of understanding is not necessarily to predict what may occur, but rather to comprehend the situation. Therefore, this study attempts to identify and explain the relation between the Egyptian citizens, the Islamists, and the Armed Forces in general, and the role of the Egyptian Armed Forces in the 25 January Revolution in particular. Using the qualitative research method, my focus will be on understanding and interpreting different factors based on a rich description. Finally, since qualitative research is much more focused on demonstrating the causes of bias rather than eliminating them, to ensure freedom of bias, I will include my reflexive position by the end of the research.

Research Designs

The construct of the research study is that of an ethnographic and content analysis qualitative design. The qualitative research design is dynamic, constantly shifting with situation change. Therefore, when realizing things that may unfold differently than expected, I will go with the flow. Furthermore, I will use flexible design to be able to tolerate the research ambiguity. I also will provide a clear picture about the problem, which contributes to reach an optimal solution or address the research questions. My plan is to address the research questions in four steps (see figure 3). First, explore the previous revolutions in Egypt's history (main causes and outcomes) and show the impact of both the Army and the Islamists in shaping Egypt's history. Second, I will briefly explain the historical relationship between the army and the people. Then I will show the army's role and challenges in the 25 January Revolution, and anticipate the Army's future status in Egypt after the revolution. Third, I will describe the change within the political scenery

associated with the rise of the Islamists. Finally, I will investigate the impacts of the post-revolution political and social shift on Egypt's foreign relations and the ME stability.




Figure 3. The Research Map

Source: Created by author.

Data Collection, Validity, and Analysis

This qualitative study relies on a combination of three main methods for gathering information, including observation, participation, and analyzing documents and materials. Both participation and observation are fundamental and highly important methods in all qualitative inquiry.³ Being an Egyptian and an officer in the Army, I was able to

participate and observe the development in the situation prior to its beginning until the moment. Knowing the historical background and the relation between the different factors helps me to provide a better assessment of the situation.

Despite problems and limitation with data resources, I was able to collect different kinds of data resources such as clips, audios, articles, and other documents from different resources along the previous period. These data are reasonable in light of the evidence and the aims of the study. Analyzing these documents and materials in a scientific way, makes it more reliable and credible. Finally, rigor in a study comes from the validity of the research, the reliability of the findings, and the use of triangulation in data collection.⁴ Therefore, to address the rigor of the analysis, transparency in presenting the data is always ensured.

Ethical Considerations

As this study utilized human behaviors and actions, and investigated on real events in Egypt's history, certain issues were addressed. The consideration of these issues is necessary for ensuring security and copyrights. These issues were identified in advance so as prevent future problems that could have risen during the research process. Among the significant issues that were considered included confidentiality and data protection. A copy of all collected data will be recorded to CDs and given to the CGSC library.

Summary

This chapter discussed the research methodology that will be employed in the qualitative study, which is that of an ethnographic and content analysis qualitative research design. Also included in chapter 3 was information on the research methodology

and design. Finally, this chapter discussed the data collection process, validity, and data analyses as well as appropriateness of the research design, and ethical assurances. The following chapter presents more data on this study, where they will be examined and assessed.

¹Michael Q. Patton, *Qualitative Research, and Evaluation Methods* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996).

²William Trochim and James P. Donnelly, *Research Methods Knowledge Base* (Mason, OH: Atomic Dog Publishing, 2006).

³Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011), 140.

⁴Trochim and Donnelly.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Egypt is the first country in the world that conceived the ideas of the system-state, national army, art and science, and civilization, which transferred to the rest of the world. Throughout ages, Egypt is always remained in the heart of its sons, who have sacrificed with the cheap and the precious showing their ultimate faith and loyalty. In the last century, Egyptians conducted consecutive uprisings in order to ensure Egypt's sovereignty, superiority, and retain its entity, culture, values, and heritage. Understanding the history of the revolutions in Egypt and other countries, and direct and indirect factors that led to the revolution, explained in chapter I and the literature review, I believe that the 25 January revolution occurred when the gap between the people's expectation and reality had increased (see figure 4).




Figure 4. How the 25 January Revolution Happened

Source: Created by author.

The Gap created a great deal dissatisfaction towards the Mubarak's regime, which led to the revolution. Peter McDonough and Antonio Lopez Pina had come to the same conclusion in their study on the political orientation of the Brazilians. However, in the Brazilian case, feelings of dissatisfaction did not necessary lead to a revolution because the opposition was not well organized as in the Egyptian case. Eventually, the 25 January Revolution occurred in order to correct the path and decrease the gap by restoring Egypt's regional and global role, ensure social justice, freedom of speech, and ensure liberal and democratic values. Among those who wanted to bring Egypt back to the right path were the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) led by the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). They engaged in the support and protection of the revolution, this comes within the scope of their tasks in maintaining national security.

The 25 January Revolution was not a direct bloody violence against the authoritarian regime. The protesters adapted Gene Sharp's concept of "Calm Heroism," which refused to respond to the violence of the former regime by adopting opposite-violence; they only defended themselves against the police aggressiveness. In (18) days, the protesters succeeded in exhausting the regime, believing that the peaceful resistance is more useful and lasting rather than the use of bloody tactics.

In this chapter, I will provide an analytical viewpoint, illustrating the relationship between the military, the government, and the people "the Clausewitzian Trinity." (see figure 5). I will also explain how these relations affect Egypt's foreign relations and the ME stability. First, I will discuss the role of the EAF and SCAF as an element of the Trinity in ruling the transitional period until handing over the power to a civilian authority. I will end this part showing different scenarios that predict the military's future

in Egypt. Second, I will show the nature of the shift within Egypt's political landscape associated with the rise of the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood as they represent the government in the Trinity. Finally, I will sum up this chapter with a viewpoint of which political archetype Egypt is likely to follow, and how this will affect Egypt's foreign relations. I will not address the people element of the Trinity as I mentioned in the thesis delimitations due to the time limitation.




Figure 5. The Clausewitzian Trinity in Egypt's Revolution

Source: Maj Thomas Tighe, "A Decision for Strategic Effects: A conceptual approach to effects based targeting," October 11, 2000, www.airpower.au.af.mil (accessed September 12, 2012), modified by author.

The Egyptian Military Role in the 25 January Revolution

The Egyptian Armed Forces, the first regular army in the history, was built to secure Egypt's civilization and has defended its territory for thousands of years. The Egyptian Army was the backbone of the state in the Pharaonic era and later periods. During the Islamic empire, the Egyptian Army fought against and defeated the Tatars and

the Crusaders, thus protecting the Arab and Islamic world. The Army derives its strength, traditions, and roots from the Egyptian military's ancient history. It is not an ideological or sectarian army, and its elements and leaders come from the Egyptian human vessel. Egypt's Army has a well-organized entity capable of managing and supporting national interests, running the affairs of state, and resolving domestic political chaos. This capability was demonstrated in 1952, when the Free Officers Movement led by LTC Gamal Abd Al-Nasser overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. The Egyptian military is still the strongest political institution that dominates Egypt's polity. In addition, every President of Egypt since the 1952 Revolution came from the ranks of the military. In 1977, the military's involvement in matters of national politics declined under President Sadat. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak embraced the Egyptian Armed Forces as a major partner in Egypt's economic development and expanded its role.

This part of the thesis will examine the EAF and SCAF roles in 25 January Revolution. To do that, I will explore briefly the history of the EAF, show the EAF socialization role, explain the EAF challenges and role during the revolution, and finally, provide an anticipation of the EAF future role in Egypt domestic affairs. I will argue that the EAF, by design and chance, has evolved into an entity that is supportive of national goals, responsible to civilian control and without overt interest in political dominance.¹

Insights on the Egyptian Armed Forces

The ancient army was an inevitable necessity in order to protect Egypt against the Bedouins, Nubians, Asians, and Sudanese, and to secure trade throughout the Sinai Peninsula; however, it was a symbolic army. The meaningful emergence of the army is the war of independence in 1560 BC led by King Seqenenre Tao (the 17th Dynasty) to

liberate Egypt from the Hyksos occupation. For two thousand years, Egypt did not have a strong national army until the arrival of Muhammad Ali, the Albanian descent who ruled in Egypt beginning in 1805, where the Egyptian army was reborn at his hands.

Muhammad Ali built a strong conscript army, military schools, Staff College, and military factories, which made Egypt Superior to the Ottoman Empire. Hereafter, Egypt became a regional power and led the Arab world in its rivalry with Israel, defending the Palestinians' rights. After the Arab humiliation by the Israeli Forces in the Six Days War in June 1967, the Egyptian Army took the responsibility to regain dignity and honor in October 1973. The October War had shown the genius of the Egyptian military planning and leadership that led to the Israeli defeat. Currently, the Egyptian Armed Forces is one of the strongest and largest armies in the world and maintains a balance of power in the Middle East. It consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Command. It runs the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), which produces civilian and military products.² Therefore, the Army is a major factor in Egypt's development plan and participates in all the economic and social fields. The Egyptians are proud of their army and dedicate their loyalty and faith on the hand of its leaders.

The Socialization Role of the EAF

Egypt maintains a large conscripted and professional army of about 468,500 personnel, which includes less than one percent of Egypt's population.³ The service length for conscripts varies with education level. Military life provides the conscripts a reasonable life and full-time training emphasizing skills transformable to civilian employment. This professional training is an instrument designed to provide soldiers with

a sense of citizenship, responsibility, and nationalism, to support the civilian economic sector, and to enhance the national economic development.

Since the 1970s, the Egyptian military has had an expanding role in economic fields. Owing to a common belief that the military attributes could increase economic growth and development, adequate equipment and large number of soldiers, and the military's goal of self-sufficiency, both President Mubarak and former Egyptian Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala shared a vision of the beneficial role of the military in Egypt's economy. Robert B. Satloff ⁴ argues that if the Army did not assume any of these economic duties, Islamic institutions would be in a position to take control of them; not a situation the government would prefer. This role can be shown in four main areas: military industry, civilian industry, agriculture, and national infrastructure.⁵

The Egyptian defense industrial sector seeks autonomy and self-reliance. Therefore, the AOI produces a wide variety of military products varies from small weapons to tanks and aircraft. According to the AOI headquarters, the Egyptian defense industrial sector goals are to increase employment; increase export earnings; to upgrade worker skills; economic development and modernization; regional power; acquisition of industrial and military technology; and encouraging Pan-Arab cooperation. The acquisition of large military industrial base supports the national income; generates employment, and boosts Egypt as a regional power.

With the signing of the Camp David Treaty with Israel in 1979, the Egyptian military converted a large portion of its focus to civilian industries. Along with military productions, military factories manufacture a variety of civilian products such as agricultural equipment, heavy engineering machines, pharmaceuticals, housekeeping

machines, clothing, stationary, microscopes, and security systems. Additionally, the military provides the civilian sector with public services such as recreation resorts, transportation, hotels, Nile cruises, sporting clubs, and medical services. These products and services are sold to military personnel and reach commercial markets. Profits from these activities are, like military export earnings, off budget.

Under the sponsorships of the National Service Project Organization (NSPO),⁶ the military is able to meet its needs and enhance civilian markets. In 1980s, the NSPO initiated a broad network of dairy farms; milk-processing facilities, cattle feed lots, poultry farms, and fish farms. The NSPO also became involved in desert reclamation process all over Egypt. The military consumes most of its products, and the surpluses are sold through commercial outlets.

The military has also been involved in major national infrastructure projects such as construction of bridges, tunnels, roads, schools, hospitals, and sewer networks whether separately or with civilian partners. This infrastructure development by the military is a national duty to the government and the people of Egypt through military resources. This process achieves social benefit, and accomplishes the military objectives of maintaining military productivity, enhancing the military's public image and self-sufficiency.

The Egyptian military is as a professional organization that continues to respond to future external and internal threats, and remains a reliable and constructive tool of influence, modernization, and stability. Services and activities provided by the military to the Egyptian citizens as well as the conscripted army system foster the civil-military relations and represent various motives and incentives for military intervention in the political process. Also it is one of the factors that helps to explain why the Egyptian

military was accepted by the people and has become a main player in Egypt's politics with the eruption of the 25 January Revolution.

Factors Make the Egyptian People Call for the EAF Intervention

Three primary factors make the Egyptian people call for the military intervention during times of crisis. First, the military is mixed with the human and psychological composition of the people. The Egyptian army is a national army, formed from all layers of the society, which makes this organization a clear reflection of the combination of the Egyptian population. It is not an army of mercenaries in the face of the people; however, the army and people started from the same principles and seek to reach the same goals in which insuring the retention and security of the state. The second factor is the military role in the economic development, where the economic role of the Egyptian military generates a high proportion of its contribution to the projects development and service sectors within the State. The third factor is the constitutional legitimacy of the Army intervention during times of crisis. According to Articles 180 to 183 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, the armed forces “shall belong to the people” and are required “to defend the country to safeguard its territory and security, and to protect the socialist gains of the people’s struggle.” Therefore, one of the military constitutional duties is to maintain Egypt’s integrity and national security. Considering the three factors, the Egyptian people called for the military support during the 25 January Revolution in order to topple the former regime. As a result of the intervention by the military, the people and the military were able to force President Mubarak to step down, declaring the end of the first republic and the beginning of the second one.⁷

Challenges Encountered by the EAF during the Revolution

Right after the outbreak of the Revolution, the SCAF declared its bias to the protesters, secured, and joined them.⁸ This was confirmed by the first statement issued by the SCAF on the first of February 2011, which announced the full understanding and support to the protesters' requests. The SCAF pledged not to fire on the protesters "as the police did," stating that the Military duty is to protect the Egyptian people and the constitutional legitimacy not the president himself. They also announced that they are in permanent session to monitor the situation indicating their permanent support the revolution. The SCAF responded to the people's demands in arresting former regime officials and bringing them to trial. The SCAF suspended the 1971 constitution, dismantled the People and Shura Councils, made a referendum on a temporary constitution, ensured the people's right to peacefully demonstrate, allow all youth and religious movement to participate in the political field, and secured and held honest and transparent parliamentary and presidential elections under difficult and critical circumstances that the country was going through. However, the revolution did not end once protests against the old system had ended. Protests continued for a long period, while social and political transformation was being settled. During this period, the Military led by the SCAF, confronted political, economic, and social challenges in order to fulfill the revolution's goals.

Political Challenges

The political challenges are associated with the political system's organizational structure, practices, and ideologies. These challenges arise through political actions

linked to different types of political conflict. There are three main challenges encountered by the SCAF. These can be shown as follows:

First, the continuation of the revolutionary momentum versus a counter-revolutionary power, in which, the protesters' demands are opposed by a counter-revolution power—represented by supporters to the former regime—who sees the revolution as a threat to their political and economic interests. Despite differences in tendencies and opinions of political parties and movements, inability to estimate the political and social environment, and covert internal and external intervention, the SCAF was able to communicate and cooperate with all of the political parties to reach an initial agreement on the structures of the post-revolution period.

Second, conflict between political elites and competing ideologies. As with any revolution, a state of chaos pervaded the political scene. This chaos was a result of horizontal and vertical conflicts. Horizontal conflicts rose due to the interaction between some of the political parties and the SCAF, in which the former wanted to have a civilian presidential council to rule Egypt instead of the military council. Vertical conflicts rose from the interaction between social and political groups due to differences in ideologies and directions—whether to make Egypt a civil or religious state-system. In a non-democratic society, these conflicts affected the SCAF's ability to communicate, and produced mistrust in the horizontal and vertical interactions. The wisdom of the SCAF in the management of these conflicts by emphasizing the importance of cooperation between all political forces and movements in order to achieve the common good helped to overcome this dilemma.

Third, problems of competition over political space. As a way to obtain power, many of the political parties used inappropriate methods, such as provoking people's religious emotions to fulfill their goals; others received external support to achieve their agendas. Islamists, liberalists, and remnants of the former regime competed to gain the people's support in the parliamentary and presidential elections. The SCAF regulated and managed this process transparently and honestly by issuing multiple statements to remind the people of constitutional requirements, by remaining neutral from all political forces, and by ultimately allowing the people to choose their president.

Social Challenges

There are two important challenges faced by the Revolution since its eruption. First, challenges inherited from the former regime related to poverty, unemployment and other social problems. Second, challenges associated with emerging problems such as violence, bullying problems, and factional demands. Social problems created confusion in the people's life, and generated obstacles in managing the society by the SCAF and the interim government.

First, the old challenges (poverty and unemployment), according to the Human Development Report in 2009, the poverty rate in Egypt is (41) percent and unemployment rates range between (10–12) percent of its population.⁹ The Revolution created ambitions and hopes to resolve problems of poverty and unemployment. Therefore, the SCAF issued its directions to the interim government to solve these problems through various initiatives including hiring all temporary contractors as to be permanent governmental employees, setting a maximum and minimum wage limit to

achieve social justice, pension reform for the poor, and providing significant funds to develop shantytowns and remote areas.

Second, the security dilemma is one of the social important challenges facing the revolution, which represents a challenge to any government. The protests resulted in desertion of the police forces from most of its stations, which created a chaotic environment and lawlessness throughout Egypt. Lack of effective security and spread of weapons stolen from the police created security problems associated with infringement on state property by the poor, the marginalized, and the rural population to solve their own problems. In an attempt to restore security, the people decided to protect the public property and confront outlaws by their own ways, which was known as “peoples’ committees.” Furthermore, the EAF deployed its forces in all over Egypt and did a major effort in the arms control, applied a curfew, and stood beside the police forces to restore its control by working on the distrust issue between citizens and police forces. Consequently, violence and bullying problems started to disappear gradually with the actual presence of military and police forces in streets. However, behaviors of various factions still caused security problems and which continue until the economic challenges are addressed.

Economic Challenges

The last three decades of rule by the former regime created various economic problems such as chronic deficit in the balance of trade and in the general budget, a continuous gap between the rate of investment and savings, increasing rates of internal and external public debt, and a decline in the tourism sector and foreign direct investment. The latter two areas were specially impacted negatively right after the

Revolution. Furthermore, the chaotic state that emerged during and after the Revolution resulted in an increased demand for the people's basic needs. To meet these challenges the SCAF instituted several procedures to aid in the overall development of the state and support the economy.

The EAF supplied the central bank with two billion dollars to support and improve the economy. The EAF contributed in solving the unemployment problem through the establishment of a number of civilian industrial factories to mitigate the rate of unemployment. The NSPO provided the population with goods and rations in the various governorates of the state. The NSPO studied demands of the foreign markets, provided the elements of marketing, and conducted promotion services for agricultural exports. The Military Engineering Authority supplied the civilian sector with more than two billion dollars through the establishment of affordable housing to solve the accommodation problem.

Besides the EAF security role, activities and projects by the EAF in the areas of real estate and housing, construction projects, land reclamation projects, food security, community development and consumer industries illustrates the size of the military contribution in pushing forward the process of the national economy. In fact, the EAF's role during the Revolution went beyond its contributions in the social and economic fields.

The Role of the EAF in Achieving the Revolution's Goals

Since the outbreak of the 25 January Revolution, the EAF took the responsibility to fill the security vacuum caused by the police forces disappearance and prevent attacks on government offices, public facilities and premises, secure vital installations, respond

to acts of violence and thuggery, looting, theft and arson in many cities; not to mention the main role of protecting the homeland. Egypt went through several events in order to cross from the transitional phase to stability phase. The EAF's role can be presented through dividing that period into three stages covering the period from 25 January 2011 until the presidential elections in June 2012.

The First Phase: from 25 January to 11 February 2011

In this phase, the EAF's main effort was to protect Egypt from collapse through providing essential services and security. The EAF's units spread-out into the vital cities and provinces in order to ensure safety and security after the disappearance of the national police forces. To prevent theft, the EAF secured all the national police camps, warehouses, and installations, which contained a huge number of weapons and ammunition. Also, it secured and controlled all the prisons from being broken into by criminal elements. Concurrently, the EAF secured the vital national installations, important Arab and foreign embassies as well as the archaeological places and the Suez Canal. Due to the wide spread of criminal and illegal activities ,the EAF secured the transportation and distribution of the central bank funds to and from subsidiary banks using the Armed Forces ground and air assets. In order to meet the citizens' needs, the EAF assisted in the transportation of goods and food in cooperation with other civilian authorities and department. In Tahrir Square, the EAF communicated with the demonstrators emphasizing its standing position along with their legitimate demands. Finally, the EAF provided all the necessary medical services in the military hospitals and in squares for the injured civilians. The EAF did its best to ensure that security, food, water, electricity, gas, and communications were available for all citizens.¹⁰

The Second Phase: from 12 February to 31 October 2011

In this phase, the EAF continued its effort to stabilize the country; meanwhile, focused its efforts on the political domestic affairs, security, and improving the national economy.

The EAF continued to assist the police forces in organizing and conducting joint campaigns to remove various infringements on state properties and agricultural land. To ensure quick deterrence in encountering the law and order situation, all illegal activities were referred to the military courts. To achieve control over the borders specially Sinai Peninsula and the western border with Libya due to the increasing arms and drugs smuggling and illegal immigration owing to the collapse of the Libyan regime, the EAF increased the security measures in order to contain various threats and risks.

The EAF contributed in relieving the deteriorating economic and financial conditions with cash from its own budget in order to refresh the national economy and prevent it from collapse. Additionally, the SCAF responded to the legitimate demands of many different sectors, calling for the improvement of their living conditions and increasing their monthly salaries and pensions. The NSPO continued to assisted in overcoming the overpopulation problem through in the establishment of a number of low-cost housing areas in many provinces.

The SCAF and EAF stood against the sectarian strife exploded between Muslims and Christians in many of the provinces that could drag the country to a civil war emphasizing the importance of the people's unity to get through that crisis. The SCAF launched an information campaign on the internet, running state media, radio, conducted seminars, and conferences on order to communicate with the civil community.

In the foreign affairs arena, the SCAF held a reconciliation conference between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo and took part in the successful completion of the prisoner exchange deal between the Palestinians and Israelis. In the political domestic affairs, the SCAF amended many articles of the Constitution, issued constitutional declaration, and conducted a referendum in March 2012 in order to ensure public consensus and legitimacy over the changes ensuring transparency and impartiality. Finally, the SCAF issued the planned timetable for democratization and promised to handover the power to an elected authority by the end of May 2012.¹¹

The Third Phase: from 1 November 2011 to July 2012

In this phase, the EAF implemented of the planned timetable for democratization in three phases; the conduct of the legislative elections; the parliament and the Shura Council elections followed by the election of the “Constituent Assembly,”¹² which was responsible of setting the new constitution; and finally, the presidential election.

To ensure an easy flow of the transition period, the SCAF held several conferences to prepare and organize the electoral process. The EAF continued its information campaign to enlighten the voters of their rights and responsibilities. The EAF conducted the necessary security measures in coordination with the civilian police to secure a number (12,491) polling centers with about 250,000 troops. For the first time in Egypt’s history, 32 million voters participated in the parliamentary elections, including the participation of Egyptians working abroad.

In the first elections for an elected governing body in the post-Mubarak era, two Islamist parties, the Freedom and Justice Party and Al Nour party won about 70 percent of the seats in the parliament, and the rest of the seats were divided among other parties.¹³

The international community praised the neutrality and impartiality of those who managed the electoral process.

After the end of the parliamentary elections, on 25 of January 2012, the SCAF issued a decision to release about 2000 detainees and prisoners arrested during the events of January 25, 2011, transferred the legislative power to the parliament “the People Assembly,” and canceled the Emergency Law. Finally, by the end of the presidential election that was held in May 2012, the SCAF handed over the power to the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Mursi on 30 of July 2012, which would be the first victory of an Islamist as head of state in the Arab world.

Despite intentional or unintentional defections in management and running the transnational period based on reaction due to lack of the political savvy, the SCAF fulfilled its promises and handed over the power and proved that they had no intentions to keep it.¹⁴ The NGOs case, civilians trials in military courts case, and being one step behind in most of the cases based on reaction, not initiative, and justifying all of its decisions and actions to the national security, do not lessen the EAF role in the 25 January Revolution. Generally, the EAF played a noble role and established itself as a positive and effective institution. This can be seen obviously when you compare Libyan, Yemeni, and Syrian counterparts with the EAF in Egypt.¹⁵ The EAF provided a good freedom model, which reflects the strong relations between the army and the people in Egypt. Eventually, the EAF returned to its barracks, but should remain a reliable and positive agent of influence, for modernization, and stability in the future. One question remains, what will be the EAF status in the Egypt’s domestic and foreign affairs in the coming years?

The Future Role of the EAF

There are three models that can be adapted by the army; intervention model, regulator model, and guard model.¹⁶ The South Korean model has succeeded to achieve stability and economic development since 1953. Will Egypt seek to follow the South Korean model “intervention role?” Will Egypt seek to follow the Turkish model “the regulator model,” where the army has been an important factor in Turkey’s foreign and domestic affairs? Will the EAF seek to follow “the guard model,” where intervention will only happen in time of wars or crisis?

Considering the nature of the relations between the army and the people as well as the economics and social role of the EAF discussed in the beginning of this chapter, there are two likely scenarios.

In the first scenario, the EAF would totally or partially manage Egypt’s political life. The intervention and regulator models are improbable. This scenario remains unlikely in light of the credibility of the decisions previously made by the SCAF and the fact that the SCAF already handed over the power to a civilian elected authority. Therefore, an EAF’s intervention in Egypt’s domestic and foreign affairs other than time of crisis and according to the constitution is unlikely. Subsequently, the intervention and regulator models will not work in a new emerging democratic country.

In the second scenario, the army will ensure impartiality and independence, and will continue in its duties while keeping an eye on domestic affairs “the guard model.” The army’s role would be limited, with intervention only in time of crisis and according to the constitutional laws, and people demands. Ensuring Egypt’s national security and protecting its borders and identity would remain the main objectives for the EAF. Given

the EAF's honorable history in supporting Egyptian citizens' rights, its social and economic role, strong relations with the Egyptian people, and its professionalism, the second scenario is more likely to happen. Hence, the ball now in the Islamists' court and only the Egyptian citizens will assess and judge their performance. When a ruler diverts from the path that the people have chosen the army will be always ready to support and protect their legitimacy; the legitimacy of the people.

The Transitional Political Landscape Overview

The military is not the only player that influences Egypt's domestic and foreign affairs. The rise of the Islamists, who filled the power void created by the collapse of the former regime, is another important player.¹⁷ In the Clausewitzian Trinity, the Islamists represent the majority of the people supporting Islamic rule, and currently, comprise the newly elected government.

As explained before in chapters 1 and 2, Al-Azhar has always played a great role in supporting the Egyptian People and defending their rights. Al-Azhar used to represent the Islamic trend, but due to many factors and the rise of the Islamic political parties and social groups or movements, its' role has declined. Other sorts of Islamic representation have filled its absence. In this part of the thesis, I will briefly provide an overview on the domestic landscape, emphasizing on the Islamists' political role during the revolution. Predicated on a diminished role adopted by the EAF, the rise of the Islamists, particularly the MB, will determine Egypt's foreign relations.

Change in Nature of the Domestic Political Landscape

According to Egypt's Constitution, currently suspended, Egypt has a multi-party system. The Constitution clearly prohibits the formation of any party on the basis of religion or discrimination under any form. In reality, the NDP was the dominant party until the 25 January Revolution in 2011. During the last seven decades, the Egyptian governments prevented any representation of religious parties or movements in the political process. Former President Mubarak followed President Sadat and Nasser's path and prevented the participation of the Islamic fundamentalists in the political process. Mubarak always presented them as a threat for the West and for the Egyptian themselves. This thinking was based on a mindset that is several decades old, and does not reflect the recent reality.

The MB group/movement, founded in 1928, has as its core ideology the idea of Jihad in order to turn Egypt towards Islamic government based on Sharia law. Such a political goal, was tolerated but suppressed by the governments according the ruling party and governments' interests. Under Nassar's regime, the MB was prohibited from operating as apolitical party and was suspended since 1954.¹⁸

The recent revolution was free from any ideological or religious slogans. Neither the Islamists nor the Christians played a significant role during 25 January Revolution. The MB group did not participate in the first day of the revolution and remained in the background because its members were skeptical about the revolution's success. This reflects the group's strategy where their leaders believed in incremental changes rather than revolutionary changes. Shortly after, the revolution gained momentum, protesters' began supporting secular and liberalist figures to represent them in the revolution. From

this initial support, the MB stood out of the crowd to represent the majority of the Egyptian conservatives in opposition to the Western leaning secularists.

The Revolution opened the gate for Egyptians of varying interests and ideologies to participate in politics. The constitutional amendments by the SCAF paved the way for all political forces to participate in the political process. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the MB group, condemned violence as a political tactic, agreed to play according to the rules, and contributed in the elections. Instead of running for the elections as individual candidates, the group has now legitimized itself and been recognized by the military and the transitional government. First, the FJP promised not to dominate the political landscape leaving a space for other parties to participate in the parliamentary elections. The group also announced that it would not run for the presidential elections. Later on, the group denounced its promises and ran for both the parliamentary and presidential elections with a maximum effort seeking power. The FJP won (47.2) percent of all the parliamentary seats and put forth Mohamed Mursi as a presidential candidate.

Thirteen additional Islamic political parties, movements, and coalitions as well as political unification have emerged (see figure 6). The Al-Nour Party is another Islamist political party that has been created since the revolution. It has an ultra-conservative Islamist ideology, which believes in implementing strict Sharia law. It has been described as the political arm of the Salafi group, which also was suppressed by the former governments. Although there are differences among different Islamist political parties and groups, they were able to unify their aims during the elections process. Each wanted Egypt to move toward the Islamic state and Sharia law. In the 2011-2012 parliamentary

elections, the Islamist Bloc led by Al-Nour party ranked as second after the FJP. The Islamist Bloc received (27.8) percent of the votes and gained 127 of the 498 parliamentary seats; Al-Nour party itself won 111 of the 127 seats. To create a kind of political balance due to the increasing Islamic influence, the Christians announced the establishment of their own political party. They established the “Christian Brotherhood” party as the first Christian political party in Egypt.¹⁹ The increasing Muslims-Christians tension was a significant factor that forced the Christians in Egypt to take the political path to express themselves rather than being silent.

On the other hand, secularists and liberalists sought coalitions and reshaped their political goals to encounter the increasing religious and conservative current; more than (36) political parties have been formed. The Egyptian Bloc and the Democratic Alliance are the most important political alliances that have been established to contain the religious trend.

The majority of the parties differs on their domestic policies and objectives but are united in supporting a more nationalistic, anti-American ,and less Israel-friendly foreign policy. With the rise of the Islamists and the post-revolution multi-party system that varies from the far left to the far right, and from secular to conservative thoughts, apparently, the shift in the political landscape will determine which political archetype Egypt is likely to follow and will affect Egypt’s future.

The following map illustrates the political parties with religious and non-religious background is an example of the post-revolution multi-party system.




Figure 6. Post-Revolution Egypt Political Parties Map

Source: MG Mohamed Elkeshky, Egypt Military Attaché in the U.S, "The Arab Spring Brief," March 24, 2010, modified by the author. The figure does not include the Christian Brotherhood Party that was established later.

Egypt's Likely Political Archetype

The Egyptian people, the military, and the government are main factors that determine Egypt's political model. Since the fall of Mubarak's regime, Scholars and politicians have argued which model Egypt is likely to follow. Owing to the common legacies, cultural, and ideologies within the Muslim World, many policy makers argued that Egypt might follow the Iranian, Turkish, Indonesian, or Pakistani models. There are many differences and similarities between Egypt and those countries, which drive different scenarios. Understanding the history of the military and the Islamic roles in Egypt illustrated in the previous chapters as well as understanding the current political landscape, the following scenarios are likely to happen:

First, Iranian policy makers argued that the 25 January Revolution was inspired by Iran's Islamic revolution. The Iranians believe that with the birth of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamists, a new Islamic era in the ME has been born. However, many Egyptians do not consider the Iranian model to be successful. There are more differences than similarities between Egypt and Iran. The majority of Egyptians are Sunni while the Iranian are Shi'a. Moreover, both Egypt and Iran have different ideologies, different goals, and even the armed forces situation and the political compositions are different. Also, the severe Iranian government response to the Green Movement in 2009 brought world condemnation on the Iranian model.²⁰ Therefore, the Iranian model will not be the path of Egypt.

Second, many scholars have claimed that the Turkish model can provide a model for the Egyptians to emulate due to the similarities between the two countries. Both countries are Muslim states that are being ruled by Islamists. Turkey is being ruled by the

political Islamic party “the Justice and Development Party (AKP),” which has similar ideology like the MB (FJP) in Egypt. Turkey has been able to achieve political and economic development with the promotion of Islamic values on the domestic and international levels. On the domestic level, Turkey has passed the test of democratic change in three decades. On the international front, it has become more politically independent, has become closer to the Arab world, and made positive contributions towards the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.²¹ Compared to the Iranian model, the Turkish model is the most successful one; however, the Turkish secular vision of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk is unlikely to be welcomed by the conservative Egyptians.

Third, Pakistan is also a possible scenario. Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, a regional and middle power, and a rapidly developing country. Pakistan's has been characterized by periods of military rule and political instability. The country faces social, security, and political challenging problems, including terrorism, illiteracy, poverty, and corruption. Recently, Pakistan is defined as a failed state by the international system.²² Considering the current situation of Pakistan and the Egyptians’ refusal to be ruled by the military, the Pakistani model is considered as a less successful model than Indonesia, and not likely to happen in Egypt.

Finally, post-Suharto Indonesia has also been argued as a potential model for Egypt.²³ Both Egypt and Indonesia are Islamic countries and have some similarities. Indonesia went through similar events, and has a civilian elected authority right after a transnational period, while the Indonesian military remaining a key player. During the last decade, the military has gradually withdrawn from politics and successfully subordinated to civilian control, but the military still has a strong role in the Indonesian

economy. Any confrontation by the government with Indonesian generals may cause unfavorable consequences. Egypt is quite different. The FJP is more organized and stronger than its counterpart in Indonesia. Also, the Egyptian civil-military relationship is more complicated. The Indonesian model has been able to achieve political and economic development, but could not reduce the economic role of the military. If Egypt is able to do so, I believe that the Indonesian model will be a good start.

There are many differences and similarities between Egypt and other countries; however, there are no two countries in the world which are alike. Thus, Egypt is likely to follow its own path. The Egyptian's path will follow whatever achieves the revolution goals. The FJP is a well-organized party and will work hard to retain the social and political leverage. They will find ways to reconcile democracy, economic development, social justice, freedom, and national independence with promotion of the Islamic values and Muslim authenticity; as has happened in a different way in Turkey and Indonesia.

The FJP has many internal challenges to contend with to ensure its success in the upcoming period. On the other hand, having gained the support of a majority of the Egyptians, this may motivate them to take some political risks, challenging the international community sometimes such as dealing with the Palestinian case. They are more likely to stand neutral between the West and the East, with more open policies to all the countries in stark contrast the former regimes. The main challenge to FJP power is the military; however, I believe that with the recent change in the EAF and SCAF headquarters, the new military leaders will prove their professionalism, respecting the people's desires and the President's directions. Meanwhile, the EAF is likely to continue its economic and social role, but unlikely to interfere in domestic or foreign politics.

In general, the new Egyptian regime will emphasize solving the internal economic and social challenges in order to insure its survival. However, in the long term, the rise of the Islamists in Egypt will definitely affect Egypt's foreign relations.

Impacts on Egypt's Foreign Relation and the ME Stability

The 25 January Revolution will have a profound impact on the ME peace and stability. As many Egyptians wished for their country, the Revolution has reestablished Egypt's position as a regional power. The Revolution was like an earthquake that shook Egypt and the entire ME region. Many scholars, policy makers, writers, and politicians worldwide praised the 25 January Revolution, showing their admiration and gratitude for the Egyptian people, and by the power of the Egyptian revolution in making regional changes.²⁴

There are very few moments in our lives where we have the privilege to witness history taking place. This is one of those moments. This is one of those times. The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same.²⁵

People have been inspired by the Egyptian revolution, calling for change towards democracy, social justice, and freedom of speech. The Revolution reached and impacted other countries such as Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria, causing what is known by the Arab Uprising or the Arab Spring. The peoples of the region saw the Egyptian revolution as the model that might bring an end to their dictatorial and oppressive regimes.²⁶ Consequently, all governments and rulers in the ME are changing their strategies and policies based on their people's demands.

Owing to Egypt's strategic and geopolitical weight in the ME, the 25 January Revolution will impact Egypt's foreign relations with other global and regional powers.

As in Structural Realism, foreign policy cannot be analyzed without any reference to the domestic politics. Therefore, the new conservative Islamic trend is more likely to impact the region's geopolitical balance. The change in the nature of the domestic socio-politic landscape post-the revolution pushes Egypt to pursue more independent foreign policy in determining its national interests. However; there have been no major changes in the regional relations yet, Egypt's new regime led by the MB will definitely affect Egypt's relations with the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and Israel as the main powers influencing the ME relations. The relations between those powers are quite complex. Egypt's disengagement with Israel and the U.S. or rapprochement with other regional actors, especially Iran, can potentially create tension in US-Egypt relations. The ME Map (figure 7) shown below is aimed to provide better understanding of Egypt's location in the ME region.




Figure 7. The Middle East Map

Source: Middle East Maps, www.mideastweb.org/maps.htm (accessed October 31, 2012), modified by the author.

Egypt–The United States Relations

Egypt has strong political, economic, and military ties with the U.S based on mutual interest.²⁷ For the U.S., Egypt is a key ally in the ME in ensuring regional and global peace and security. Former President Sadat promoted the U.S. interests in the region by signing the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979. Former President Hosni Mubarak, supported the U.S. policies in the 1991 Gulf War, sending two Egyptian divisions to support the coalition forces in liberating Kuwait. Egypt has been supporting the U.S. operations in Afghanistan by treating more than 7,200 Afghan patients every

month at the Egyptian Field Hospital at Bagram Air Field.²⁸ Egypt has also been participating with a large number of troops in peacekeeping missions in all over the world, supporting the international peace and security. Additionally, Egypt provides the U.S. a safe passageway through the Suez Canal, which links the West with its interests in the East. Finally, intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been always maintained for the global war on terrorism.

For Egypt, the U.S. is a major provider in the economic and military arenas. The U.S. provides Egypt with a foreign military and economic aid reaches 1.3 billion dollars a year.²⁹ Egypt also co-produces M1 Abrams Tanks using the assembly facility near Cairo as part of their modernization program. Egypt imports large quantities of corn and wheat from the U.S. to meet its people's needs. The USAID to Egypt helps in building a peaceful and prosperous future.³⁰

Understanding the strategic value of maintaining a good relationship with Egypt, President Obama gave a powerful speech at Cairo University in 2009, emphasizing U.S.-ME relations. The U.S. also has always reaffirmed its commitment to transparency and accountability, emphasizing the need for political reform and fair elections. Despite these admonitions, the U.S. maintained the status quo with Mubarak's regime. Obviously, the 25 January Revolution presents a new reality, which makes it difficult for the U.S. to uphold its outdated foreign policy toward Egypt. Time has changed; the Egyptian people will no longer tolerate leaders that follow the U.S. policies.³¹ The Egyptians have indicated that they do not want U.S. aid. Egypt's public opinion has become a key factor in making domestic and foreign policies; not as it was before. The U.S. understands that the Egyptians will reject any intervention in their domestic affairs, seeking their political

and economic independence for their country. According to Egypt's Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi in an interview in the Washington Post, "Egypt's future foreign policies will be more free and independent while remaining allied with the United States."³²

The decline of the Egyptian- U.S. relationship was inevitable following the revolution. The NGOs and the USAID are very sensitive issues that caused many problems during the last period. There is a broad sense of opposition to the United States aid and NGOs in Egypt over the course of the last thirty years. The U.S. officials should coordinate with the Egyptian government in this regard, putting in their minds the cultural and ideological sensitivity of the Egyptians' people. Promoting democracy is important, but it should be on the Egyptian way and according to their religious and cultural aspects.

The peace between Egypt and Israel has been a cornerstone of the American approach and American foreign policy in the Middle East since the 1970s.³³ One of the critical issues that will cause friction between the United States and post-Mubarak Egypt is the U.S. support to Israel on the expense of the Palestinians. In conjunction with the current change in Egypt, the people's satisfaction of the U.S. policies and settlement of the Palestinian case shape and impact the Egypt-U.S. relationship. Also, the current government, dominated by the MB, will be more sensitive to the Palestinian problem. The U.S. policies towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict disappoint the entire Muslims, Arabs, and Egyptians. Therefore, impartial and balanced relations by the U.S should be ensured in order to promote regional peace and security. The American bias towards Israel damages the U.S reputation, grows the gap, and increases tensions in the region.³⁴

Thus, a consolidated relationship with governments that represents the people would tighten the gap with the U.S. and promote stability in the ME.

The Egyptian foreign relations following the revolution will be more independent in determining its national interests and based on balanced relations between the West and East. The Egyptians' public opinion has become a key factor in the political process. People's satisfaction of the Egyptian's government performance and the United States' policies will affect the political arena in the ME. Promoting and maintain a good relationship between Egypt and the U.S. is subject to less interference in the domestic affairs, coordinated and transparent role of the NGOs, mutual respect, and settlement of the Palestinians-Israeli conflict.

To sum up this part, Egypt-U.S. relations is more likely to worsen as the new government led by the MB will likely deviate from the former foreign policy. The 25 January revolution is a message to the United States that its policies in the ME based in the relations with dictators and authoritative governments are no longer maintainable. If the U.S. wants to maintain its role as a key player in the ME and maintain its regional partnership with the regional players, the U.S has to change its policies and find ways to engage people, not only governments.

Egypt-Israel Relations

From 1948 to 1978, the bilateral relations between the two countries were described as tense and unstable. In 1978, the Camp David peace accord between Egypt and Israel ,sponsored by the U.S, was signed. The accord aimed to end the Egyptians-Israeli conflict and to ensure bilateral economic and political relations between the two countries. The agreement notably made Egypt the first Arab state to officially recognize

Israel.³⁵ During the last 30 years following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula, both Egypt and Israel have enjoyed normalization of relations, and a peaceful relationship. However, Israel remains detested by many Egyptians owing to its atrocity against the Palestinians.³⁶

The 25 January Revolution and cut of exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel, which was one of the factors that led to the revolution, led to fears in Israel about the future of the treaty and bilateral relations.³⁷ There are three opinions towards the issue that definitely affects Tel-Aviv and Cairo relations: (1) abolishing the treaty; (2) maintain but modify the treaty; (3) the treaty maintained as is. First, the Deputy Chief of the Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, said that they will not recognize Israel's right to exist, the treaty is non-binding, and will be put to a referendum.³⁸ Second, Egyptian opposition called for Cairo's peace treaty with Israel to be "reassessed."³⁹ However, despite many Islamic and liberal parties calling for abolishing the peace treaty and the diplomatic representations, both the SCAF and President Morsi have affirmed Egypt's commitment to maintain the Peace Treaty with Israel.⁴⁰ Additionally, Egypt's foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi reaffirmed that Egypt is going to comply with every international and regional treaties and abide by every treaty it has entered into.⁴¹

Thus, all signs indicate that the Peace treaty will remain in place and the normalization of political and economic relations between Egypt and Israel will last. This issue is becoming more critical for several reasons. First, most of the Egyptians refuse to continue with what they called "the Zionist entity" that rejects any UN resolutions, occupies the Palestine land, establishes illegal settlements, and kills the Palestinian people. Second, the MB relations with the anti-Israel group "Hamas" and the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) are more likely to be supportive, which may cause political tensions in the years to come. Third, security of Sinai Peninsula is a very sensitive issue for both Egypt and Israel. Outlaws and radical Islamists, who ran from the Egyptians prisons during the revolution, use the Sinai as a safe hub to launch terrorist attacks against Egypt and Israel. Egypt's military operations to restore law and order in Sinai led to Israeli fears that Egypt may keep heavy forces in the demilitarization zone, violating the peace treaty with Israel, which in turn threatens the Israeli national security. Finally, the Israeli commando's aggression in the international water in 2010 against the Turkish humanitarian aid vessel (Mavi Marmara), delivering aid to Gaza, worsens the Israeli-Turkish relations and increases its isolation.⁴²

The Palestinian case will be the corner stone of Egypt-Israel relations. Finding a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will improve the security situation in the ME, and lessen the Israeli hatred by the Arabs. Although the government officially reaffirmed its commitment to abide by the treaty, Egyptian masses and public opinion will not play ally to Israel, and are more likely to increase the pressure on the government to be more sensitive to any Israeli aggression. For the Israeli, Turkey has gone and Egypt appears to be on way.⁴³ Promotion of the Turkish-Egyptian relationship could be used as a pressure card to increase Israel's isolation, as the later continues on its belligerent path against the Palestinians. Consequently, political tension is expected to increase, but the treaty and the diplomatic representation are more likely to continue, with less economic cooperation.

Egypt–Turkey Relations

Religious, historical, economic, diplomatic and ties bind Egypt and Turkey. There are no conflicts between Cairo and Ankara, and they are considered as key players in the ME peace and stability. Islam is the main religion in the two countries. Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 until the end of WWI. During the former President Mubarak's era both countries signed a free trade agreement and a memorandum of understanding. More economic and trade relations have dramatically increased post the 25 January revolution. Cairo and Ankara have had maintained diplomatic relations after the fall of the Caliphate in 1924.

Since 1925, the bilateral relations between the two countries have witnessed improvements and declines. However, the Egyptian-Turkish relations have had improved since the 1990s, due to many reasons.⁴⁴ First, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as “Islamist-rooted” helped Turkey rebuild relations with Cairo. Second, the rise of Iran following Iraq invasion 2003 encouraged Egypt to strengthen its relations with Turkey to counterbalance Iran's growing influence in the region. Third, growing exports of both Cairo and Ankara opened the gate for more economic and military relations. Finally, the AKP's policies with respect the Israel-Palestinian conflict are in line with those of the new Egyptian government. It is important to underline that both Turkey and Israel had a strong bilateral relations and military cooperation since the 1980s; however, it has badly declined since 2009. Due to Turkey's liberal orientation to the West and its relation with Israel, Egypt has always been suspicious of the Turkish efforts to involve itself in the Arab's affairs in ways that have might shift the region's geopolitical balance.⁴⁵

The 25 January revolution and deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations shoved the gate wide open to the development of bilateral relations between Cairo and Ankara.⁴⁶ There are many economic and geopolitical resemblances between the two countries in terms of the nature of the domestic socio-political landscape and regional interests. Both countries have strong a robust military cooperation and complementary economic interests. They also are in favor of stability in the ME through the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli problem, solving regional disputes, and a non-nuclear region.⁴⁷

Egypt's recent tendency to bind it ties with Turkey has a debatable impact over ME stability. On one hand, if Egypt-U.S. and Turkey-Israel relations decline, Cairo-Ankara cooperation is more likely to increase Israel isolation. This possibility has a negative impact on the ME stability because it leaves no chance to pacify the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and leaves Israel to solve the issue of the Iranian nuclear program by military means, which deteriorates ME stability. Also, strategic alliances in the area may increase arms race, and consequently, increase the level of tension in the region. On the other hand, Egypt-Turkey relations along with a balanced relation with both the U.S. and Israel is more likely to bring peace to the ME region. It helps in the reconciliation of the Palestinian-Israeli problem, pacification of any regional disputes, and having a non-nuclear Iran through a political means.

Egypt–Iran Relations

Egypt and Iran are among the most influential countries in the Middle East. Moreover, ties between the two countries have witnessed a noteworthy improvement after the 25 January revolution. Historically, Cairo-Tehran relations have often been described as being tense. Both Egypt and Iran consider their conflict to have deep

historical roots, they have different ideological approaches, and competing regional interests.

During ancient times, there were always conflicts between the Persian Empire and the Egyptian Empire over regional leadership. Even during the Islamic era, when Persia entered into Islam, problems over religious and ideological aspects continued. The majority Persian Shi'a have always wanted to spread out their anti-Sunni ideology to become a dominant actor in the ME.

The period between 1939 and 1978 witnessed an improvement in the bilateral relations between Egypt and Iran. This period had begun with upgrading of the diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level, but ended with severe decline in the diplomatic relations due to two main factors.⁴⁸ First, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel and became the first Arab country to recognize Israel. Second, the eruption of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1980 led Iran away from the West, which Egypt had started to adapt following 1979. The relations increasingly worsened due to Iran's support to the assassination of President Sadat, and Egypt's support to Iraq against Iran in the first Gulf War from 1980 to 1988, which were another serious source of hostility between the two states.

In recent times, Iran's policy seeking regional hegemony in the ME, and its support to Hamas and Hezbollah is another key factor that has always negatively shapes Egypt-Iran relations. During Mubarak's regime, diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries slightly improved. Nevertheless, it declined owing to Iran-Egypt exchange of blame over the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinians conflict in 2008-2009. The Mubarak government viewed Iran's support to Hamas and Hezbollah as a

threat to regional security.⁴⁹ Additionally, Egypt's Mubarak opposed the Iranian nuclear program as Egypt considered it as a definite threat to the ME stability. Finally, apprehension of Iranian terrorist cell in Egypt before the revolution had caused a sharp decline in Cairo-Tehran relations as that confirmed Mubarak's allegations that Iran has always supported terrorism activities in Egypt.

After the 25 January revolution, Iranian officials have worked with Egypt's interim government to restore diplomatic ties with Egypt.⁵⁰ Politicians saw Egypt's permission to pass Iranian warships through the Suez Canal, which has never happened since 1979, as a significant development. A spokesperson for Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "Mubarak's regime used to see Iran as an enemy, we do not."⁵¹ It is important to underline that and growth in Cairo-Tehran relations is considered as a threat to the Arab Gulf countries as they are Sunni Muslims and pro-Shia'. Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Al Arabi told his Saudi counterpart "relations with Iran won't be at the expense of Egypt's relations with the Arab Gulf, or [at] their expense of security and stability."⁵² A series of economic and diplomatic visits by both Iran and Egypt officials continued after the revolution aimed at developing the bilateral relations between the two countries.⁵³

Despite differences of ideologies, beliefs, and regional interest between Egypt and Iran, all signs indicate that the new government in Egypt led by the MB will pursue a more independent foreign policy. Egypt will be more open in its relations with Iran; however, Egypt is more likely to stand against nuclear Iran because this is against Egypt's policy of having a non-nuclear ME. In addition, nuclear Iran affects Egypt-Gulf countries relations and affects the geopolitical balance in the region. Finally, Egypt may

develop a good economic and diplomatic relations with Iran to increase the political pressure on Israel to adapt a more peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinians conflict or to create balance in the region.

In conclusion, the political transition in Egypt after the 25 January revolution will affect Egypt's foreign relations with the USA, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Palestine and consequently impacts ME stability and security.⁵⁴ Egypt is more likely to pursue more independent foreign relations with balanced relations between the East and the West as it matches its national interests and ensures peace and stability to the ME region. Egypt will pursue ways to restore its prestigious position and regional leadership in the ME.

Summary

This chapter provides an analytical perspective of the post-revolution impacts on Egypt's foreign relation and ME stability. First, the chapter discussed the Egyptian military's role during the 25 January revolution. In this part of the chapter, the author aimed to identify the future of the EAF in Egypt's domestic and foreign relations. Through the comparison of the military's role in different countries that went through the same conditions like Egypt, the author reached the conclusion that the possibility of indefinite military rule in Egypt is low due to a shift in the socio-political landscape.

Second, the chapter discussed how the change in the socio-political landscape after the revolution, especially with the rise of the Islamists, is more likely to impact what political archetype Egypt will follow, and consequently, affect Egypt's foreign policy and the ME stability. Having compared the Turkish, Iranian, Indonesian, and Pakistani models, the author reached the conclusion that a more democratic, pluralistic, participatory, public-spirited, and responsive political system is the real possibility.

Additionally, Egypt is more likely to follow its own political archetype that reflects its national identity and ensure its sovereignty, prosperity, and prestigious leadership position.

Finally, the chapter provided an analytical view of how Egypt's domestic affairs and political transition influence its foreign policy. Through explaining Egypt's relations with the USA, Israel, Turkey, and Iran, the author reached the conclusion that Egypt's regional and international relations balanced relations between the East and the West. Egypt will continue its strategies to ensure a secure, stable, and peaceful Middle East with more emphasis on increasing its economic and diplomatic relations with all countries according to its national interests.

¹LTC Stephen H. Gotowicki, U.S. Army, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (National Defense University 1994-1995).

²The Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) is one of the largest industrial organizations in Egypt, which links to 32 defense production plants. It is State-owned and enjoys an international status that gives it complete flexibility in decision-making. About 20,000 highly skilled workers trained in AOI training facilities and specialized training centers in Egypt and abroad.

³Gotowicki.

⁴Robert Satloff, *Army and Politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988), 14.

⁵Gotowicki.

⁶The National Service Project Organization (NSPO) is a Ministry of Defense subsidiary established to control projects in the exclusively civilian sectors of the economy and reorient the military toward national economic development efforts.

⁷The first republic commenced right after the 22nd of July, 1952 Revolution led by the Officers Free Movement. Four Egyptian military presidents ruled Egypt during the first republic: General Muhammad Nagib, President Nasser, President Sadat, and President Mubarak. The second republic starts with the new president after the 25th of January Revolution.

⁸See all of Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Decrees, The Cabinet of Ministers, www.egyptiancabinet.gov.eg (accessed August 27, 2012).

⁹United Nations Development Program, "2010 Egypt Human Development Report," www.undp.org.eg (accessed May 17, 2012).

¹⁰The SCAF official page on Facebook, translated, <http://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces> (accessed October 25, 2012).

¹¹The U.S. Congressional Research Service, "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," September 13, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf> (accessed October 25, 2012).

¹²Members selected from both the parliament "the People Assembly" and Shura Council that represent all sector of the society in order to set the new constitution.

¹³Ben Wedeman and Richard Allen Greene, "Egypt's historic vote heads towards conclusion," *CNN News*, May 24, 2012, www.cnn.com (accessed May 19, 2012).

¹⁴To know more about the EAF and NGOs relation in Egypt during the revolution, see Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Transition under Military Rule*, June 21, 2012, Congressional Report, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf (accessed May 21, 2012).

¹⁵To know more about the role of the military in the Arab revolts, see Zoltan Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (October 2011), www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Barany-22-4.pdf (accessed May 19, 2012).

¹⁶The three models are the author's origin thoughts.

¹⁷Hamid, Shadi, "The Rise of the Islamists," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 40-47, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67696/shadi-hamid/the-rise-of-the-islamists (accessed May 19, 2012).

¹⁸To know more about the Islamists in Egypt, see Cynthia Farahat, "Middle Eastern Upheavals: Egypt's Islamist Shadow," *Middle East Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 19-24, www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/2887.pdf (accessed May 23, 2012).

¹⁹AlBawaba News, "Egyptian Copts start rival Christian Brotherhood," July 5, 2012, www.albawaba.com/behind-news/egypt-coptic-christian-brotherhood-432745 (accessed May 23, 2012).

²⁰The Green Movement refers to a series of actions after the 2009 Iranian presidential election, in which protesters demanded the removal of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from office. Green was initially used as the symbol of unity and hope for those asking for annulment of what they regarded as a fraudulent election. Witnesses to

Green Movement protests often claim that protests of this size have not been seen in Iran since the 1979 revolution.

²¹Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the only Muslim Democracy," *Middle East Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (March 1994): 41-49, www.meforum.org/216/why-turkey-is-the-only-muslim-democracy (accessed May 29, 2012).

²²The TRIBUNE, "Pakistan ranks 12th on failed states index: Report," June 21, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/193321/pakistan-ranks-12th-on-failed-states-index-report> (accessed October 25, 2012).

²³Suharto (8 June 1921–27 January 2008) was the second President of Indonesia, having held the office for 31 years from 1967 following Sukarno's removal until his resignation in 1998. The legacy of Suharto's 31-year rule is debated both in Indonesia and abroad. Under his "New Order" administration, Suharto constructed a strong, centralized, and military-dominated government.

²⁴Egypt State Information Service, "Egypt's Revolution in the Eyes of World Leaders," www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/reveulotion/ehhtml/enEyes_of_the_World.htm (accessed June 6, 2012).

²⁵President Obama, February 11, 2011.

²⁶The Economist, "Egypt's Revolution: Staggering in the Right Direction: Ex-President Hosni Mubarak and his Sons are detained," May 14, 2011.

²⁷The U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs," Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Fact Sheet, August 22, 2012, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm (accessed August 13, 2012).

²⁸Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in DC, "Egypt Field Hospital in Afghanistan," www.egyptembassy.net/07.html (accessed September 9, 2012).

²⁹Gotowicki.

³⁰The U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs."

³¹Sayed Khatab, "Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East" (IACM 24th Annual Conference, July 3-6, 2011, Istanbul, Turkey), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872581 (accessed August 18, 2012).

³²"Egyptian Foreign Minister Optimistic about Ties with US," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 2011,

³³Steven A. Cook and Hasib J. Sabbagh, “U.S.-Egypt Ties on Shifting Sands,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2012, www.cfr.org/egypt/us-egypt-ties-shifting-sands/p27346 (accessed August 23, 2012).

³⁴Robert Satloff, “Policy Alert: Filling the Strategy Vacuum in the Middle East,” June 14, 2011, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/persian-gulf-states/all/all/1969-12-31/2012-09-11/50 (accessed August 26, 2012).

³⁵Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Camp David Accords Sep 17, 1978,” www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process (accessed September 6, 2012).

³⁶Israeli Atrocities against Palestinians, <http://current.com/11d5u4c> (accessed October 25, 2012).

³⁷Ian Black, “Egypt protests: Israel fears unrest may threaten peace treaty,” *The Guardian*, January 31, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/israel-egypt-mubarak-peace-treaty-fears (accessed September 6, 2012).

³⁸Jack Khoury, “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Fate of Israel peace treaty may be decided in referendum,” *HAARTEZ*, January 1, 2012, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889 (accessed September 9, 2012).

³⁹Oren Kessler, “Egyptian opposition figure: Rethink Camp David Accords,” *the JERUSALEM POST*, February 14, 2011, www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=208085 (accessed September 9, 2012).

⁴⁰CBN News, “Egypt Commits to Maintaining Israel Peace Treaty,” August 24, 2012, www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2012/August/Egypt-Commits-to-Maintaining-Israel-Peace-Treaty/ (accessed September 9, 2012).

⁴¹Sayed Khatab, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East.”

⁴²Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara; Incident and Its Aftermath,” June 23, 2010, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41275.pdf (accessed September 9, 2012); See also Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Asher Susse, “Turkish-Israeli Relations in a Trans-Atlantic Context,” www.dayan.org/fulltext/turkish-israeli-relations.pdf (accessed September 9, 2012).

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴Atilla Sandikli, “Turkey-Israel Relations Have Hit Rock Bottom,” *BiLGESAM*, www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php (accessed September 10, 2012).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Dina Samir, "Egypt-Iran rapprochement: Prospects and challenges," August 30, 2012, Ahram Online, english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/51448/Egypt/Politics-/EgyptIran-rapprochement-Prospects-and-challenges.aspx (accessed September 10, 2012).

⁴⁹Dina Samir, "Egypt-Iran rapprochement: Prospects and challenges," August 30, 2012.

⁵⁰Will Fulton, Ariel Farrar-Wellman, and Robert Frasco, "Egypt-Iran Foreign Relations," *IRANTRACKER*, August 11, 2011, www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/egypt-iran-foreign-relations (accessed September 11, 2012).

⁵¹Egypt Independent, "Egyptian FM: Gulf fears of Egypt-Iran détente unjustified," April 17, 2011, www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-fm-gulf-fears-egypt-iran-detente-unjustified (accessed September 11, 2012).

⁵²Will Fulton, Ariel Farrar-Wellman, and Robert Frasco, "Egypt-Iran Foreign Relations," *IRANTRACKER*, August 11, 2011, www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/egypt-iran-foreign-relations#_ednref16 (accessed September 11, 2012).

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Sayed Khatab, "Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East."

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

—Winston S. Churchill, *The End of the Beginning* (1943)

Introduction

The new dawn in Egypt is a turning point in the history of the Middle East. Toppling the former regime did not mean the end of the revolution; it was just the beginning. Handing over the power by the military to an elected civil authority was perhaps the end of the beginning. The study provided an analytical viewpoint, demonstrating the relationship between the military, the government ruled by the Islamists, and the people. A qualitative research methodology is used for this study through a combination of three main methods for gathering information, including observation, participation, and analyzing documents and materials. The study covers the period of the military rule, from January 2011 until the handover of power to the civil elected authority in May 2012.

The study concluded that the Egyptian Armed Forces presented an honorable role, supporting the people, stabilizing the country during that critical period, and paving the road to the democratization process. Following the handover of power, the EAF is more likely to adapt “the guard model.” The EAF is more likely to ensure impartiality and independence, and continue in its normal duties while keeping an eye on the domestic affairs. The study also concluded that the change in the political landscape following the 25 January revolution has unequivocal impacts on the country’s foreign relations and

stability in Middle East. Thus, Egypt is more likely to follow its own political model that reflects its national identity and ensure its sovereignty, prosperity, and prestigious leadership position. Now, the responsibility goes to the current government, led by the Islamists, and the Egyptian people to determine the revolution's end, to be successful or not. This will be the real beginning of a new democratic and prosperous Egypt.

Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis was primary to answer the following question: how have the Egyptian Armed Forces' role in the 25 January revolution and the rise of the Islamists post-revolution affected Egypt's foreign relations and Middle East stability? In order to answer this question, it was imperative to examine some other critical factors that lead to the answer, including the military, the Islamists, and the new political landscape. Therefore, understanding the EAF's role in the revolution and the nature of the socio-political change were vital to understand Egypt's foreign relations and their impacts on Middle East stability.

Through the course of this study, it provided answers to all the secondary questions that lead to the primary one. First, the thesis had to answer the question: what were the factors that led to the revolution? This question is important because it explains the gap between people's expectations and reality that was created by the former regime. The 25 January revolution was not a surprise except for those who had their eyes closed to the domestic challenged that had been accumulating over the past 30 years. The thesis classified the factors that sparked the revolution to direct and indirect factors. Due to those factors, the Egyptian people went to Tahrir Square calling for liberty, freedom of speech, democracy, human dignity, individual rights, and social justice. The people alone

could not topple the former regime if the EAF stood on the government side. Unlike the militaries of Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the EAF stood on the people's side, and played a significant role in forcing President Mubarak to resign.

Additionally, through applying theoretical and analytical approaches in studying historical examples of revolutions, the study presented three main points. First, the people, the Islamists, and the Army are the main power centers that influence Egypt's past, present, and may be its future. Second, civil resistance and support of the military have always been critical factors that led to revolution failure or success. Third, the revolution was a mixture of spontaneity and organization. Cyber activists succeeded in transferring the people's frustration and anger to an uprising against the old regime. Then, the people organized themselves and started their revolt that led to toppling that regime.

Second, the study clarifies the EAF's role and challenges in order to stabilize Egypt and direct it towards democracy. Through briefly exploring the Egyptian military's history and the nature of the relations between the EAF and the Egyptian people, it becomes clear that the EAF had to take the people's side. The EAF responded to the people's call because its mission is to defend the country to safeguard its territory and security, and to protect the people's social gains in order to maintain Egypt's integrity and national security. However, the revolution did not end once protests against the old system had ended. It was just the beginning of the EAF to encounter the transitional period challenges due to the shift in the political and social arenas. During that period, the Military led by the SCAF, confronted political, economic, and social challenges in order to fulfill the revolution's goals and meet the people's demands. To have a better understanding of the EAF's role in dealing with those challenges, the study divided the

EAF's role to three phases. The EAF's main purposes were to prevent Egypt from economic and security collapse, stabilize the country, and governance through an implementation of a timetable for democratization and handover the power to an elected civil authority. Eventually, the SCAF fulfilled its promises, handed over the reins of power, and the EAF returned to their barracks. So, what does it mean, and what will be the EAF status in the Egypt's domestic and foreign affairs in the coming years?

Third, to prefigure the EAF's position following the revolution, the study answered the question: what is the future of the Egyptian Military status in Egypt's future? The study presented three models, intervention, regulator, and guard, which the EAF may adapt in the future. In a newly emerging democracy, the guard model is more likely to be adapted by the military. The EAF is more likely to ensure impartiality and independence, and continue in its duties while keeping an eye on domestic affairs, with intervention only in time of crisis and according to the constitutional laws, and people demands. The possibility of indefinite military rule in Egypt is low due to a shift in the socio-political landscape. Other models are unlikely in light of the credibility of the decisions previously made by the SCAF and the fact that the SCAF already handed over the power to an elected civil authority.

Fourth, the study answered the question: how will the shift in the political landscape and the rise of the Islamists affect Egypt's future? The 25 January revolution opened the gate for Egyptians of varying interests and ideologies to participate in politics, particularly the Islamists. The rise of the Islamists has filled the political gap created by the fall of the former regime, and caused a shift in the political system. The number of the political parties dramatically increased and varied comparing to their numbers before the

revolution. Additionally, Islamists, mainly the FJP and Al Nour parties, are dominating the political scene. Despite differences in their agendas, they are united in supporting a more anti-American and less Israel-friendly foreign policy. So, will the shift in the political landscape determine which political archetype Egypt is likely to follow and how will that affect Egypt's future?

Fifth, since the change in the socio-political landscape after the revolution, especially with the rise of the Islamists, is more likely to impact what political archetype Egypt will follow, the study answered the question: which political archetype is Egypt likely to follow? In an attempt to answer this question, the study presented four scenarios that are likely to occur through a comparison of the current Turkish, Iranian, Indonesian, and Pakistani models. The author reached the conclusion that Egypt is more likely to follow its own political archetype that reflects its national identity and ensure its sovereignty, prosperity, and prestigious leadership position.

Finally, the study aimed to answer the question: what is the future of Egypt's foreign relations associated with the shift in the political realm, and how will this impact the Middle East stability? Chapter 4 provided an analytical view of how Egypt's domestic affairs and political transition influence its foreign policy. Through explaining Egypt's relations with the USA, Israel, Turkey, and Iran, the study concluded that Egypt's regional and international relations balanced relations between the East and the West. Egypt is more likely to continue its strategies in order to ensure a secure, stable, and peaceful Middle East with more emphasis on increasing its economic and diplomatic relations with all countries according to Egypt's national interests.

Recommendations

The study provided a general insight of the socio-political scene and the military role before, during, and after the course of the 25 January revolution. Hence, this research provides a reliable source of information for those who are interested in researching this turbulent period of Egypt's modern history. Since the research handled the issue of Egypt's revolution from domestic and foreign perspectives, the study endorses the following recommendations.

First, the Egyptian military attained a global respect and appreciation of its honorable role in the 25 January revolution. The EAF reaches this degree for its upscale and civilized dealings with the issue, for exercising the highest degree of discipline with the revolutionists, and through the management of the transitional period. Change of names of the military leaders or the exclusion of the Army from the political process does not mean that the Army's role has eliminated. The EAF should remain neutral; take care of Egypt's security while keeping an eye on the domestic and foreign political landscape. Any future intervention role by the Army should be subject to the people's call, necessity, and constitutional legitimacy.

Second, the Muslim Brotherhood should be circumspect in formulating their agenda; Egypt must come first. The FJP, the ruling party, duty is to protect Egypt's interests, values, and promote a peaceful environment that push Egypt forward. Therefore, it is recommended to maintain the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel to maintain a stable ME and work hard to promote peace and security in the region. Formulating Egypt foreign policy should be directed to solve Egypt's internal economic and social challenges. In addition, in order to achieve a political reform, all Egyptians

including, liberals, Christians, and others must be involved in shaping Egypt's present and future. The MB leaders must put in their minds that an Islamic hegemony of the socio-political scene would build another authoritarian party and government, and will lead to another revolution. Furthermore, Liberal and secular parties must be unified to represent a strong front and a strong opposition to the current system. All the political elite must know that the Egyptian people fear nothing and they are able to make another change if you let them down.

Third, the Egyptian people must maintain an active civil role in the democratization process. Egyptian youth showed their ability to make the change through virtual and actual space. Egyptian youth should keep influencing the government and express themselves using modern social media and through an effective participation in all social and political activities. Also, all the Egyptians must participate in the democratization process and nation building; the Egyptians' votes are important for a better life. Without an effective and constructive participation and strong public opinion, the revolution gains will vanish and a new authoritative government or party will emerge.

Finally, the world must not be afraid of the Arab Spring because it embodies universal values: dignity, freedom, respect for human rights, and the right of people to choose their own leaders. The United States must deal with the Arab Spring as an existential issue for its foreign policy in the ME region. The vital role-played by Egyptian youth in the revolution, the impact of modern technologies and social media in making change, and the rise of the Islamists will direct Egypt's foreign policies. Therefore, the U.S. needs to change its policies towards the Middle East. The U.S. should use public diplomacy to communicate with the Arab peoples, and not ignore the fact that the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict is tied to the current regional developments. A peaceful and fair compromise to the conflict that includes the recognition of the Palestine state would promote peace in the region. The U.S. should know that any success attained by the U.S. in this file means victory in the eyes of the Arab people. Also, the U.S. should stop threaten to cut or reduce its foreign aid to Egypt, otherwise it will lose its value. This is a real opportunity to provide support to the people in the region to promote peace and security. Additionally, the study recommend that the U.S. foreign policy give inherent interest to the rising youth generation in the ME region. The rising youth generation should occupy a special space in its speech and development programs in these areas. Also, the U.S. media should play an important role in eliminating worries about the rise of Islam forces in the Arab countries. A strategic dialogue between the U.S. and the current Islamist government is important to prevent any misunderstanding and promote peace and security.

Recommendations for Further Studies

Undoubtedly, the civil-military relationship is a topic that scholars and researchers will continue to deal with in the future. This research primary focus was on the Egypt Armed Forces and Islamists' role in the 25 January revolution. The research provided detailed information about the military's role during the revolution and a superficial look to the current political landscape. It is therefore important to conduct a research on the political landscape, presenting the dynamic relations between different political parties and their perspective agendas. Additionally, owing to time limitation, the study focused in Egypt's relations with the U.S., Israel, Iran, and Turkey. Therefore, there is a need to clearly address Egypt's foreign relations with other regional power and other

influencing countries in the region such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The rise of Islamists, mainly dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, represents an ideological threat to the Saudi's Salafis, which may start supporting Egypt's Salafis to create a kind of balance and contain the spread of the revolutionary spirit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Finally, it is worth researching the impact of the rise of a new generation of Islamists in the EAF. A new generation will enter the military career, which means a radical change in the demographic nature of the EAF. On the long term, this change may impact the EAF behavior and attitude. Further studies should aim at addressing this new phenomena and its impact and the ME stability.

GLOSSARY

- FJP** The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) is an Islamist political party in Egypt. The party is supposedly independent, but has strong links to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the largest and best-organized political group in Egypt.
- SCAF** The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, also Higher Council of the Armed Forces consists of a body of 19 senior officers in the Egyptian military. Because of the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the Council assumed the power to govern Egypt from its former President Mubarak on February 11, 2011.
- The Democratic Alliance is a coalition of 15 political parties formed after the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Some of them split off due to differences on ideologies. The parties differ on domestic policies but are united in supporting a more nationalistic, less Israel-friendly foreign policy.
- The Egyptian Bloc is an electoral alliance that has been formed by several liberal, social democratic, and leftist political parties and movements, as well as the traditional Islamist Sufi Liberation Party to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood, and its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party from winning the parliamentary election in November 2011.

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